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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
Full Employment, or a New Reserve Army?  
A Marxian Critique of the Employer of Last Resort 
 
The notion that the government should guarantee jobs is gaining political popularity in 
the United States. Over the past twenty years, a branch of post-Keynesians has developed 
a policy proposal known as the employer of last resort (ELR), which they argue would 
achieve full employment through direct government job creation. However, many have 
argued that this proposal is deficient, both in its design and its potential for 
implementation. While most critiques of this policy have come from other post-
Keynesians, this thesis contributes to the controversy surrounding the ELR by examining 
it from a Marxian perspective. Specifically, this thesis aims to address the ELR’s neglect 
of political and class power dynamics. Included in this investigation is a comparative-
critical analysis of the post-Keynesian and Marxian theories of unemployment and of the 
state, which I argue exposes deficiencies in the post-Keynesian theory. While I am 
sympathetic to the goals of the ELR, I argue that the lack of class analysis in post-
Keynesian theory and policy inhibits the ELR advocates from appreciating the obstacles 
to the achievement of their goals. Therefore, I would suggest that Marxian analysis be 
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I. Introduction 
  
The official unemployment rate in the United States at time of writing (November 2018) 
is 3.7 percent, which is the lowest rate since 1969 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018a). 
The natural rate of unemployment (NAIRU), the lowest rate of unemployment hat can be 
achieved without increasing the rate of inflation, is currently at 4.6 percent 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2018). By these measurements, mainstream economists 
argue that the United States economy is currently operating beyond full employment, 
despite the fact that there are millions of unemployed people and that the labor force 
participation rate is at a 40-year low (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018b). Mainstream 
economists view such a level of unemployment as natural, unproblematic, or inevitable. 
 A group of post-Keynesian economists argue, contrary to the accepted wisdom of 
the mainstream, that there is a way to reduce unemployment to a level below one percent 
in peacetime without causing inflation. This can be achieved by a government 
employment program called the employer of last resort (ELR). Active at the Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, the University of Missouri–Kansas City, and at the 
University of Newcastle in Australia, these economists (referred to subsequently as the 
‘ELR advocates,’ or the ‘ELR architects’) reject the idea that there is a zero-sum tradeoff 
between full employment and price stability. Instead, they argue that unemployment, and 
many of the social ills such as depression and crime that are caused by it, can be 
effectively eliminated (Tcherneva, 2017). As will be elaborated, the ELR is designed to 
achieve full employment by providing a job to anyone who is willing and able to work, 
regardless of skill (Tcherneva, 2012a). The ELR would stabilize prices by operating as a 
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countercyclical supplement to private sector demand. Moreover, the ELR advocates 
appeal to the moral authority of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Martin Luther King Jr., 
who viewed a guaranteed job as a human right (Forstater, 2002).  
 The last 20 years have seen an explosion of scholarship detailing the design of the 
ELR (e.g. Wray 1998; Kaboub 2007; Tcherneva 2018), and the notion that the 
government should guarantee jobs is regaining political attention in the United States 
(Krieg 2018). However, there are many post-Keynesians who, despite being sympathetic 
to the goals of the ELR, have criticized the proposal (e.g. Sawyer, 2003 and 2005; 
Seccareccia 2004; Sturgess 2016).  
This thesis contributes to the debate surrounding ELR and full employment by 
critically analyzing the ELR from the perspective of Marxian political economy. The 
main question this thesis asks is: Can the ELR achieve full employment? A corollary to 
this question will be: Is sustained full employment possible, under any circumstances, in 
a capitalist economy?  
Like the post-Keynesian critics of the ELR, I am sympathetic to the goal of 
eliminating unemployment. But as this thesis will demonstrate, the ELR architects have 
not provided convincing evidence that (1) the ELR is a policy capable of eliminating 
unemployment, or (2) that sustained full employment (as defined below) is possible in a 
capitalist economy. While the ELR offers a theoretical solution to unemployment within 
capitalism, I argue that the neglect of power dynamics and class analysis in ELR 
scholarship precludes the ELR advocates from understanding some obstacles to the 
implementation of the ELR and the achievement of sustained full employment. While I 
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do not take a definitive stance on whether capitalism can sustain full employment, the 
discussion below leads me to be very skeptical that it can. 
 In order to theoretically contextualize my critique of the ELR, the first half of this 
thesis is a comparative analysis of the Marxian and post-Keynesian theories of 
unemployment and of the state. In Chapter 2, I compare Marxian and post-Keynesian 
unemployment theory. Both post-Keynesians and Marxists view unemployment as an 
intrinsic problem of capitalist economies. However, post-Keynesians view the state as an 
agent capable of ending unemployment, whereas the Marxian view is that unemployment 
as performing a necessary role in capital accumulation (what I call the ‘class function’ of 
unemployment), and thus cannot be eliminated in a capitalist system. I also argue that 
post-Keynesian ELR advocates should incorporate the Marxian class function of 
unemployment into their theory and policy proposals. In Chapter 3, I show how the post-
Keynesian theory of the state lacks theoretical coherence, which is particularly 
problematic given the state’s central role for the ELR. The Marxian theory of the state is 
presented as a more theoretically rigorous and useful analytical framework.  
 In the second half of this thesis, I discuss the ELR and contribute to the chorus of 
criticism mounted against it. In Chapter 4, the ELR is introduced, along with existing 
large-scale government employment programs: The New Deal in America and 
Argentina’s Plan Jefes. Many existing criticisms of the ELR from the post-Keynesian 
perspective are surveyed in this chapter. It will be concluded that while the goals of the 
ELR may be worth pursuing, the ELR cannot simultaneously achieve price stability and 
meaningful long-term employment. Chapter 5 constitutes my Marxian critique of the 
ELR. In this chapter, I argue that the political and class obstacles to full employment are 
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neglected by the ELR advocates. Building on Kalecki’s (1943) concerns regarding the 
political pitfalls of full employment, I contend that the ELR is likely not feasible in the 
United States today. I argue that even if the ELR were implemented, it would not bring 
about full employment, but rather that the ELR population would function as a ‘reserve 
army of the employed’ serving the same role under capitalism as the traditionally 
unemployed. While ELR advocates downplay the role of mass movements in existing 
large-scale employment programs, here they are viewed as crucial to their 
implementation. In my conclusion, I argue that in spite of the political obstacles to the 
ELR and large-scale employment programs in general, full employment is still a goal 
worth pursuing.  
In order to avoid confusion for the reader, what follows is an explanation of 
several terms used throughout this thesis. Following Lavoie (2014), the term ‘post-
Keynesian’ is used to denote a ‘broad tent’ of all those who reject neoclassical 
microfoundations and are primarily influenced by Keynes, while ‘Post Keynesian’ refers 
to a more specific subset of ‘Fundamentalist’ post-Keynesians. I most often engage with 
the small-tent group of Fundamentalist Post Keynesians, as they are the ones who 
developed the ELR. 
The term ‘Marxian’ will be used to denote the broad school of economic thought 
that follows the method of Marx, while the term ‘Marxist’ will refer to individual 
scholars of the Marxian tradition.  
Due to the increasing political popularity of the term ‘Job Guarantee,’ Post 
Keynesian scholarship has largely stopped titling their program ‘ELR.’ However, I 
continue to use ‘ELR’ in this thesis, since it more precisely describes the policy as 
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proposed by Post Keynesians. This also disambiguates the ELR from the several Job 
Guarantee proposals put forth by politicians in the United States in recent years.  
Full Employment is defined in this thesis as Keynes’s (1980) ‘less-than-one-
percent’ unemployment in peacetime. As noted above, the mainstream metrics of full 













                                                     
1 This definition reflects Keynes’s goals regarding what levels of employment could possibly be achieved 
through the use of direct employment programs, and should not be confused with his definition of a full 
employment of productive resources, a situation in which “a further increase in the quantity of effective 
demand produces no further increase in output” (1936, p. 303). 
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II. An Overview of Unemployment Theory in Marx and Keynes 
 
The main argument of this thesis is that the architects of the employer of last resort (ELR) 
policy do not provide convincing evidence that the ELR can achieve permanent full 
employment in a capitalist economy, because full employment is incompatible with the 
needs of capital accumulation. In this chapter, I critically analyze Keynes’s 
unemployment theory, upon which the ELR policy was designed. This will be contrasted 
with the unemployment theory of Marx. Both Marx and Keynes viewed unemployment 
as a structural, foundational, and deleterious component of capitalism, and their 
theoretical contributions remain relevant to the real economic conditions of the 21st 
century. However, while Keynes viewed the unemployment as “an irrational by-product 
of capitalism’s normal operations,” Marx argued that unemployment has a necessary role 
to play in capitalist economies (Forstater, 2005, p. 248). Like Keynes, the ELR advocates 
fail to adequately consider the role of unemployment under capitalism (what I call the 
‘class function’ of unemployment). This chapter has two goals: (1) to provide a 
theoretical basis for my Marxian critique of the ELR, and (2) to examine the potential for 
a synthesis of the two theories, in order that they might be mutually improved. In the first 
section of this chapter, I discuss the Marxian theory of unemployment. 
 
2.1. Marx: The Reserve Army of Labor  
 
The accumulation of capital is the fundamental engine of production and growth of the 
capitalist system, without which it would not survive. For Marx, an inevitable byproduct 
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of capitalist accumulation is a sizable of the unemployed, which he called the ‘reserve 
army,’ or the ‘surplus population,’ by which the capitalist economy is sustained. This 
phenomenon is the cornerstone of Capital Vol. 1; indeed, he calls it “the absolute general 
law of capitalist accumulation” (Marx, [1867] 1990, p. 798, italics in original). 
Capitalist class, following its class interests, strives to accumulate as much capital 
as possible. When capitalists hire workers, the workers become one function of capital 
accumulation; they are the ‘living part of capital.’ The working class participates in 
capital accumulation only insofar as they are a necessary tool of capital; it acts “not in 
accord with its own will or self-activity, but in accord with the movement of capital” 
(Braverman, [1974] 1998, p. 261).  
Individual capitalists are spurred by competition to introduce cost-saving 
technological advancements into the production process. Technological innovation in 
production leads to the increasing replacement of labor (variable capital) with all other 
means of production, such as machinery (constant capital). This shift in the ‘organic 
composition of capital’ is exacerbated by capitalism’s tendency toward ‘centralization’ 
(wherein capitalist firms absorb other firms), which “supplements the work of 
accumulation by enabling industrial capitalist to extend the scale of their operations” 
(Marx, [1867] 1990, p. 779). Thus,  
 
[i]t is capitalist accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces indeed 
in direct relation with its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant working 
population, i.e. a population which is superfluous to capital’s average 
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requirements for its own valorization, and is therefore a surplus population. (ibid., 
p. 782, italics added) 
 
Technological advancement, driven by competition, throws workers out of work as they 
are replaced by machinery.  
Because capitalism depends on expansion and also is subject to cyclical “periods 
of average activity, production at high pressure, crisis, and stagnation” (ibid., p. 785), the 
surplus population it produces becomes a necessity to accommodate for the regular 
workings of a capitalist economy. Marx writes that the surplus production  
 
becomes a condition for the existence of the capitalist mode of production. It 
becomes an industrial reserve army … a mass of human material always ready 
for exploitation by capital in the interests of capital’s own changing valorization 
requirements. (ibid., italics added) 
 
The reserve army ‘belongs’ to the capitalist class in the same way as employed labor; the 
capitalists dictate, based on their requirements for surplus value, whether and to what 
extent the reserve army becomes engaged in the process of surplus value creation.  
 Capitalist accumulation not only produces a surplus population of unemployed 
workers, but there is also a tendency for this surplus population to expand:  
 
the greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and energy of its 
growth, and therefore also the greater the absolute mass of the proletariat … the 
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greater is the industrial reserve army … this is the absolute general law of 
capitalist accumulation. (ibid., p. 798) 
 
Herein we find what Marx finds to be a damning intrinsic feature of capitalism: the very 
technological advancements that are necessary for capital accumulation create the 
conditions for an ever-expanding mass of unemployed. “The working population 
produces both the accumulation of capital and the means by which it is itself made 
relatively superfluous; and does this to an extent which is always increasing.” This 
creates a situation where “the accumulation of misery [is] a necessary condition, 
corresponding to the accumulation of wealth” (ibid., p. 799).2 
Marx also observed the periodic expansion and contraction of the economy, 
which has since become the widely-accepted phenomenon of ‘business cycle.’ These 
cycles dramatically affect the surplus population: he notes that “during the periods of 
average prosperity, [the surplus army] weighs down the active army of workers; during 
the periods of over-production, it puts a curb on their pretentions (ibid., p. 792). Thus, the 
reserve army “contains within itself a mechanism for regulating the wage level and hence 
for maintaining profits” (Sweezy, 1942, p. 91). This is the ‘class function’ of 
unemployment, by which the reserve army ensures the dominance of the capitalist class; 
stricken with Orwell’s ‘haunting terror of unemployment,’ and constantly threatened by 
                                                     
2 A common response to this claim is that the experience of history contradicts the ‘absolute law.’ 
However, they make the error of assuming that Marx meant that this was absolutely true under all 
circumstances. He writes that this absolute general law is “like all other laws … modified in its working by 
many circumstances, the analysis of which does not concern us here” (Marx, [1867] 1990, p. 794). In Vol. 
1 of Capital, Marx focuses on the dynamics of production, assumes a competitive market, and makes 
abstractions to his model economy that he removes in later volumes (Harvey, 2010). Government 
intervention in the economy has mitigated the expansion of the reserve army at times, but this is a 
circumstance that does not repudiate the tendency described above. Indeed, the neoliberal project, which 
began in the late 1970s, has made the conditions of today’s United States economy more closely resemble 
the model of capitalism Marx puts forth in Vol. 1 of Capital.  
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the advance of the reserve army, the employed suffer lower wages, longer hours, and 
precarious job security. As we can see from this discussion, unemployment is an 
instrument that is integral to the reproduction and survival of the capitalist system, which 
is characterized by the dominance of the capitalist class.3 If we accept this line of 
thought, the Keynesian notion of full employment is not possible under capitalism, even 
if the state implements interventionist policy. In the following section, I analyze the 
factions of Marx’s reserve army, and provide theoretical and empirical basis for a 
modernized application of a Marxian understanding of unemployment. 
 
2.2 The Factions of the Surplus Population – from Marx to Present Day  
 
Marx categorized the reserve army of the unemployed into three factions: the floating, the 
latent, and the stagnant, to which he added ‘pauperism’ ([1867] 1990, p. 794). I will 
briefly delineate the three factions and, with reference to other Marxist scholars, show 
how they manifest in the present-day economy. Marx wrote at a time in which capitalism 
was a relatively new economic system that did not enjoy its current economic and 
hegemonic dominance; today’s ‘late-capitalist’ economic conditions are distinct from 
those of the mid-1800s. 4 Notably, the state’s intervention in the economy has changed 
the nature of the business cycle so that depressions with mass unemployment are not 
                                                     
3 The capitalist class is not a monolith; there is competitive activity between individual capitalists and 
sectors of the capitalist class. While it escapes the purview of this thesis, the relationship of unemployment 
to competition between the real productive capitalists and the increasingly powerful financial capitalists 
would be an interesting topic for further research.  
4 Ernest Mandel’s (1975) concept of ‘late capitalism’ “in which the fundamental laws of motion and the 
inherent contradictions of capital not merely continue to operate, but actually find their most extreme 
expression” is characterized by neoliberalism, international corporations, globalization, and large role of 
the state in the economy. While he adapts Marx’s writing to modern conditions, Mandel (1975) in no way 
suggests that capitalism has changed in essence; Marx’s analysis of the capitalist mode of production 
remains fundamentally relevant to today’s society.  
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‘inevitable’ (Sherman, 1972). There is a need to re-contextualize Marx’s unemployment 
categories in our present-day economic reality.  
The floating surplus population is present in the industrial sector of the capitalist 
economy. This surplus faction consists of those who are “sometimes repelled, sometimes 
attracted again in greater masses ... although in a constantly decreasing proportion to the 
scale of production” (Marx, ([1867] 1990, p. 794). The floating population chases after 
the movements and advances in capitalist production, which is constantly evolving to 
adapt to changes in technology. As capital becomes centralized and work more 
specialized and transitional, there emerges a contradiction “inherent in capital’s very 
movement … that the natural increase of the number of workers does not satisfy the 
requirements of the accumulation of capital, and yet, at the same time, exceeds those 
requirements” (Marx, [1867] 1990, p. 795).  
The floating surplus population roughly corresponds to the mainstream notion of 
‘frictional unemployment,’ except that the mainstream theory presupposes that this type 
of unemployment is a temporary disconnect between the needs of individual capitalists 
and the skills and availability of individual workers that tends towards an equilibrium 
level. Marx, on the other hand, suggests that the capitalist class as a whole requires more 
or less labor during each business cycle, with a secular decrease in labor needed over 
time as technology advances. Again, the decrease in demand for labor relative to capital 
is a tendency that can be counteracted by socio-historical and economic forces. We can 
easily observe that the floating surplus population persists in today’s economy; the ‘Great 
Recession’ of the late 2000s pushed official unemployment levels past 10 percent in the 
United States, and the ‘recovery’ has been characterized by reemployment in more 
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precarious working conditions (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018; Katz and Krueger, 
2016).  
 The latent population consists of agricultural workers who, when displaced by 
technological advances in production, have nowhere to turn for employment within their 
industry. Their displacement has two effects: the influx of unemployed into the urban 
labor market, and the ability for agricultural capitalists to increase the rate of exploitation 
of agricultural laborer. This increases the overall surplus population and leaves the 
agricultural worker with “one foot already in the swamp of pauperism” (Marx, [1867] 
1990, p. 796).  
 It may seem at first glance that the latent reserve faction is non-existent today; if 
we are referring specifically to the displacement of agricultural workers by industrial 
labor in the imperialist nations, that is true. Capitalism’s displacement of agricultural 
workers was a singular historical process that has run its course in a majority of the 
industrialized world as of the late 20th century. However, we still see the phenomenon of 
displacement of entire sectors of the United States economy under late capitalism, due to 
both increases in technology and the globalization of labor and capital markets. 
Braverman ([1974] 1998) observed that the scientific-technological revolution displaced 
workers in science and tech-heavy industry even as the industries themselves grew (p. 
264). Clerical, service, and retail jobs have largely displaced industrial jobs in the United 
States; laid-off industrial workers are a new form of the ‘latent surplus population.’ The 
globalization of production by the imperialist powers via multinational corporations 
moves industry to the developing world, where small farmers are displaced, providing a 
new pool of laborers available for exploitation by capital.  
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 The stagnant reserve army perhaps contributes most to capitalist accumulation; it 
offers “an inexhaustible reservoir of disposable labor power” because it consists of the 
irregularly and marginally employed. This faction is recruited from the latent and floating 
surplus populations and forms of itself a “self-reproducing and self-perpetuating element 
of the working class, taking a proportionally greater part ... of that class than other 
elements” (Marx, [1867] 1990, p. 796). The stagnant reserve army acts as leverage for the 
capitalist to discipline labor via the threat of replacement by the swelling ranks of the 
reserve army. The stagnant reserve population is accompanied by ‘pauperism,’ which 
Marx refers to as “the hospital of the active labour-army,” and includes “the demoralized, 
the ragged ... those who succumb to their incapacity for adaptation” (ibid., p. 797).   
The ‘irregular and marginal employment’ of the stagnant reserve army is perfectly 
manifest in the ‘gig economy’ of the late-capitalist neoliberal economic regime. The term 
‘precariat,’ popularized by Guy Standing (2011), describes the contemporary sub-class 
corresponding to the stagnant reserve population: those that have part-time, contract labor 
with no benefits or job security. This faction of the unemployed makes up a growing 
percentage of the labor force in the United States and elsewhere.5 Likewise, the ‘pauper’ 
class remains relevant today as those who do not appear as unemployed on national 
records, but are relegated to the periphery of society and listed as ‘outside of the labor 
force.’  
                                                     
5 Data on the so-called gig-economy is still somewhat dubious, because there are conflicting legal and 
economic definitions of jobs that constitute the gig economy. Nevertheless, there have been several studies 
that attempt to provide understanding of this phenomenon. The National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) released a study in 2016 that claims that ‘alternative working arrangements’ such as freelance 
work and contract employment rose from 10.7 percent in February 2005 to 15.8 percent in late 2015 (Katz 
and Krueger, 2016).  
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In summary, the logic of capital that dictates the capitalist production process 
necessarily brings forth unemployment, by which capital accumulation is supported. The 
industrial reserve army provides a population of those that can respond to capital’s ever-
changing requirements for valorization, and keeps the employed from demanding a larger 
share of the value they produce.6 Although there are situational differences between the 
capitalism of the 1800s and that of the 21st century, the fundamental nature of class 
antagonism in the production process remains consistent (Mandel, 1975). Thus, the 
conditions that produce unemployment largely remain the same, regardless of the varying 
levels of government intervention in the economy. In the following section, I transition to 
the analysis of Keynes’s unemployment theory.  
 
2.3 Keynes: Involuntary Unemployment  
 
Keynes’s 1936 magnum opus, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, 
argues that a normally functioning capitalist economy would operate below levels of full 
employment because the entrepreneur class must make production decisions for an 
uncertain future based on effective demand. Thus, state intervention is necessary to 
ameliorate the intrinsic flaws of capitalist economies. Explicitly written for an academic 
audience, Keynes hoped to convince his “fellow economists, not the general public” 
(1936, p. vi). This perhaps contributes to the confusion and disagreement surrounding 
Keynes; what passes for ‘Keynesian’ in the public discourse (welfare state economics, 
deficit spending, etc.) often does not engage with the actual content of his work 
(Tcherneva, 2012b). A great deal of effort has been devoted since the time of Keynes to 
                                                     
6 These dynamics are empirically observed in the United States today. See Basu (2013).  
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presenting and defending his work in a way that preserves his ‘revolutionary’ break with 
economic orthodoxy (Robinson, 1937; Minsky, 1975). This thesis aims to deal with 
Keynes’s actual work, and those Post Keynesians who adhere to it.  
Written during the Great Depression, the General Theory is commonly 
understood as a work that primarily attempts to explain the causes of unemployment in 
capitalist economies and to ameliorate it. Keynes’s novel concepts of effective demand, 
the marginal efficiency of capital, liquidity preference, and propensity to consume are all 
constructed in order to show how ‘involuntary’ and ‘structural’ unemployment can and 
does exist and that equilibrium is seldom, if ever, achieved.7 Indeed, anxiety of system-
wide collapse spurred by intolerable levels of unemployment is an explicit motivation for 
Keynes’s work. Like in Marx, unemployment is an endemic characteristic of the 
capitalist system that places the whole of society at risk:  
 
It is certain that the world will not much longer tolerate the unemployment which, 
apart from brief levels of excitement, is associated — and in my opinion, 
inevitably associated — with present-day capitalistic individualism. But it may be 
possible by a right analysis of the problem to cure the disease. (Keynes, 1936, p. 
381) 
 
 Keynes (1936) saw the orthodox reliance on Say’s Law to be an inadequate analytical 
framework for explaining the “economic society in which we actually live” (p. 1); it may 
represent “the way in which we should like our economy to behave” but to “assume that 
                                                     
7 I will assume some cursory knowledge of the concepts mentioned here; the theoretical innovations of the 
General Theory are elaborated elsewhere in the literature. See Robinson (1937), Minsky (1975). Where 
relevant, I will describe each in the analysis that follows.  
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it actually does … is to assume our difficulties away” (p. 34). Say’s Law, briefly, is the 
postulate that, in the aggregate, supply brings forth its own demand, since economic 
actors will spend their money some way or another. From this law, orthodox economists 
assume full employment and price adjustment via the market mechanism of supply and 
demand as a given for normally functioning market economies. The rejection of the 
equilibrium condition of full employment is the premise on which the General Theory 
begins its analysis.  
The categories of unemployment laid out by the orthodox economists are 
‘frictional’ and ‘voluntary’ unemployment. As mentioned above, these are respectively 
made up of those who are either in-between jobs or do not wish to work at the prevailing 
wage rate on offer. Neoclassical theory sees these two groups as a normal, non-
problematic aspect of a working economy; some level of the frictional and voluntary 
unemployment is assumed to be the condition of an economy that is at full employment. 
Keynes accepts these two categories of unemployment in his analysis, but does not think 
that they account for all unemployed members of an economy.  
Keynes’s rejection of full employment equilibrium is grounded in his explanation 
of how capitalists (whom he refers to ‘entrepreneurs’) determine their production and 
hiring process.8 Because the capitalist class bases their production on expected future 
profits, the level of employment is determined by the outlook of capitalists. Supply based 
on an uncertain anticipated level of future demand is Keynes’s concept effective demand, 
which “is the substance of the General Theory of Employment” (Keynes, 1936, p. 25). 
                                                     
8 There is some confusion in Keynes regarding the capitalist class. He uses the individual ‘entrepreneur’ as 
the stand-in for ‘capitalist’ and seems to think of the capitalist class as a collection of individual 
entrepreneurs. So, he does not reliably consider the differences between the interests of individual 
‘entrepreneurs’ and that of the capitalist class as a whole.  
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Because the future is fundamentally uncertain, capitalists’ propensity to invest and 
employ workers is affected by psychological factors that disallow them from acting in a 
way that regularly facilitates full employment. To the contrary, “the effective demand 
associated with full employment is a special case” that happens “by accident or design,” 
if ever (p. 28).  
Because of the incongruity of effective demand and full employment levels of 
investment, involuntary unemployment regularly exists in capitalist economies, where 
workers are willing to work at a given wage, but are not offered employment. We can 
now summarize Keynes’s unemployment theory, as laid out in the General Theory, and 
generally accepted by subsequent post-Keynesian scholars as follows:9 Contrary to 
mainstream orthodox theory, Say’s Law does not hold in real-world economies; supply 
does not bring forth its own demand. At the macroeconomic level, employment supply is 
determined by the entrepreneur’s decision to invest, which is in turn dictated by their 
expectations of profit in an uncertain future (that is, effective demand). Effective demand 
equilibrium does not regularly coincide with full employment; involuntary 
unemployment (along with massive inequality, which exacerbates unemployment) is a 
fundamental flaw in capitalist society that needs to be identified and remedied in order to 
prevent the entire system from collapsing. The ELR is based on this understanding of 
unemployment; its advocates begin with the premise that free markets may never produce 
full employment, so the state must intervene to boost the level of effective demand from 
the private sector to a level corresponding to full employment. They argue that this can be 
done through a direct employment program. However, like Keynes, they do not consider 
                                                     
9 Geoff Mann (2017a) notes that Keynes’s (1937) reiteration of the crucial role of fundamental uncertainty 
has led some to call Keynes himself ‘the First Post Keynesian.’  
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the class function of unemployment. The following section attempts to compare, and 
synthesize if possible, the two unemployment theories discussed in this chapter.  
 
2.4 Conclusion: Integrating Marx and Keynes 
 
Keynes believed that the General Theory had solved the “paradox of poverty in the midst 
of plenty” (1936, p. 30). Marx thought similarly of Capital, in which he endeavored to 
“reveal the economic law and motion of modern society” ([1867] 1990, p. 92). Both had 
hoped that the knowledge they provided to their intended audience (for Marx, the 
revolutionary proletariat, for Keynes, the benign enlightened elites) would provide the 
spark for the necessary changes needed to solve the fundamental flaws in capitalism. 
Marx and Keynes also shared a profound dissatisfaction with the unscientific or 
unrealistic foundations of ‘vulgar political economy’ or mainstream-neoclassical 
economics, and both considered their methodology to be applicable to real-world 
economies. From these more general similarities in methodology and theory, we can 
compare how the two theorized on unemployment.  
Several of Keynes’s contributions can be read as a sophistication or 
reinterpretation of Marx’s theory. A primary example of this is Keynes’s (1930) concept 
of the ‘monetary production economy,’ which is of fundamental importance to his 
general theory. For Keynes, money functions as a store of value, and thus ‘liquidity 
preference’ plays a huge role in the willingness of capitalists to invest in production. The 
capitalist (entrepreneur) class dictates production and employment based on expected 
monetary profit (Dillard, 1948). In a draft chapter of the General Theory, Keynes credits 
 25 
Marx with the initial observation of capitalism as a monetary production economy 
(Henry, 2011).10 In addition, Marx developed a theory of the business cycle that, along 
with technological advances, explained the cyclical fluctuations in investment and 
production that necessitated a reserve army of the unemployed. Indeed, if one were to 
look to Keynes’s writings before or after the General Theory, they would find much 
clearer resemblance to Marx; this is perhaps a byproduct of Keynes’s stated intent of 
convincing mainstream economists, with whom Marx would be viewed unfavorably 
(Sardoni, 2011).  
Despite these similarities, there are important differences between the two 
regarding the causes and function of unemployment. This can be associated with their 
respective views of the capitalist class. It hardly bears mention that Keynes viewed the 
bourgeoisie favorably while Marx viewed them critically. Whereas Marx attributes the 
cause of unemployment to technological change based on the rapacious and destructive 
logic of the capitalist class, Keynes’s concept of effective demand explains involuntary 
unemployment as an irrational byproduct of production decisions made in an uncertain 
world. However, I do not see these two explanations to be in conflict; they can each be 
incorporated and strengthened in order to better explain the continued existence of 
unemployment. Keynes’s concept of effective demand can fit within the Marxian 
paradigm, while Post Keynesians should incorporate the class function of unemployment 
into their theory, in order to appreciate the role that unemployment plays in the capital 
accumulation process.11 
                                                     
10 Marx’s M-C-M monetary production schema, from Vol. 2 of Capital, is dealt with in the next chapter.  
11 I should note that Marx did develop a concept of effective demand in Vol. 3 of Capital, which is based 
on his understanding the role of money in capitalist society. For Marx, the willingness to hoard money 
results in a lack of aggregate demand that may trigger a crisis (Hein, 2015). Keynes’s theory of effective 
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We now turn to the categorizations of the unemployed. As stated above, Keynes 
found it necessary to add the ‘involuntary unemployment’ category to the existing list of 
neoclassical distinctions of ‘frictional’ and ‘voluntary’ unemployment. Involuntary 
unemployment exists because entrepreneurs make production and hiring decisions amidst 
fundamental uncertainty. Marx was less explicitly concerned with who ‘wanted’ to work. 
Employment itself comes with alienation and exploitation under capitalism. Both 
employment and unemployment is ‘involuntary’ since both groups ultimately belonged to 
the capitalist class; “the only thing worse than being exploited is not being exploited” 
(Denning, 2010, p. 79). Workers had the choice between accepting a wage that amounts 
to less than the value of their labor, or starvation. However, we can draw parallels 
between Marx and Keynes. Marx’s ‘floating’ army coincides loosely with the frictional 
unemployment of Keynes and the neoclassicals, as stated above. Because both Marx and 
Keynes rejected Say’s Law, the stagnant reserve army can be said to occupy the same 
space as Keynes’s involuntary unemployed. Keynes’s concepts of effective demand and 
involuntary employment can, along with an updated understanding of Marx’s reserve 
army (and the class function it carries out), form a cohesive ontology of unemployment in 
a modern real-world setting. The following chapter of this thesis is a continuation of my 
comparative investigation into the theories of Post Keynesian and Marxian economics, 




                                                                                                                                                              
demand is more thoroughly developed, and is utilized by some Marxian economists, in particular the 
Monopoly Capital school.  
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III. Can the State End Unemployment? Examining the Function and Nature of the State 
in the Post Keynesian and Marxian Traditions 
 
Unemployment, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is seen by both Marx and 
Keynes to be an inherent and deleterious byproduct of capitalist production. The 
question, then, becomes: What, if anything, can be done to solve the problem? For Marx, 
the contradictions of capitalist logic inhibit capitalism from solving its unemployment 
problem. However, for Keynes and Post Keynesians, the state is seen as the entity 
capable of eliminating unemployment. Post Keynesian policy proposals for the state’s 
role in stabilizing the economy in the face of an uncertain future (what I will call the 
‘function of the state’) are robust and well-developed. However, they do not have a 
coherent theory of the nature of the state. The state is assumed to be a neutral, benevolent 
force in the economy. When the state policy is utilized appropriately by policy makers, 
voted into power through democratic institutions, it will act to ameliorate the endogenous 
flaws of capitalism. I argue that this view of the state amounts to wishful thinking, which 
contradicts the post-Keynesian position that economic theory should be founded on 
realistic assumptions (Lavoie, 2014).12 How can post-Keynesians, who aim to analyze the 
“economic society in which we actually live” (Keynes, 1936, p. 1), and rely so heavily on 
state intervention in the economy, not directly and critically examine the nature of the 
state? What the state is capable of, or what it ‘ought’ to do, is not the same as what it is. 
What’s more, Post Keynesians fail to recognize that there is an ontological difference 
between the ‘state’ and the ‘government.’ The deficiency of the Post Keynesian state 
                                                     
12 Lavoie (2014) identifies ‘realism’ as the epistemological foundation of post-Keynesianism, which holds 
that economic theory should represent reality.  
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theory is a fundamental aspect of the criticism I mount against the employer of last resort 
policy (ELR).13  
 In contrast, the Marxian tradition offers an explicit theory of the state: under 
capitalism, the state is an apparatus of institutions (including the government) operating 
by and for the ruling class, which ensures the reproduction of the conditions needed for 
the capital accumulation process. In this chapter, I attempt to distill Keynes’s theory of 
the state, and will critically analyze the (usually implicit) state theory of the Post 
Keynesians. Then I will introduce the Marxist theory of the state as the more realistic 
alternative, which Post Keynesians would benefit from incorporating into their analysis. 
Important to this discussion is the difference between the government and the state, 
which will be highlighted when relevant. A critical examination of the Post Keynesian 
theory of the state will contribute to a better understanding of the ELR and the obstacles 
it faces. 
 
3.1 Keynes: “Leave it to me” 
 
It is well known that Keynes’s General Theory fundamentally changed the role of the 
state in a capitalist economy. However, while Keynes has an obvious recommendation 
for the role of the state, a clear theory of the nature of the state was not elaborated in a 
concise way in Keynes’s writing. This section attempts to synthesize a summary theory 
of the state based on Keynes’s disparate writing on the subject.  
                                                     
13 Recall that I use the term “Post Keynesian” to mean the Fundamentalist Keynesian school of thought. 
The term post-Keynesian is used for the ‘broad tent’ heterogeneous tendency of heterodox Keynesians. 
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 Keynes (1930) espouses a state theory of money, wherein the state is seen as the 
institution that introduces money into the economy. Keynes viewed capitalism as a 
monetary production economy (described in Chapter 2 of this thesis), and so the state is 
essential for the basic working of capitalist production.14 
 Because capitalism suffers from inherent flaws that, left unchecked, would prove 
disastrous, Keynes gave the state the responsibility for the overall performance of 
macroeconomic activity (Pressman, 2006). In fact, Keynes saw the state as the sole 
economic actor that has the capacity to save capitalism and ‘civilization’ in general from 
its structural deficiencies. Keynes (1936) proposes that the state, equipped with the “right 
analysis of the problem” can “cure the disease” of unemployment (p. 381).  
 As Keynes was confident of his own analysis, he maintained that “[t]he economic 
problem is not too difficult to solve. If you leave it to me, I will look after it” (1982, p. 
34). This framework implies that the state only needs to be presented with the ‘right’ 
ideas in order to function as a benevolent actor on behalf of the economy (and society) as 
a unified whole. The state is presumed to play an active role in employment, by 
bolstering the effective demand level to a level corresponding to full employment. For 
example, Keynes suggested that state aid in effective demand management by 
“calculat[ing] the marginal efficiency of capital-goods on long views and on the basis of 
general social advantage” (1936, p. 164). Without the state, capitalism would devolve 
into a worse form of society.  
  Keynes’s perception of the state downplays the role of power imbalance and class 
antagonism. While Keynes “recognized classes and class relations as determining the 
essential social structure of the economy,” the state is not subject to these relations 
                                                     
14 See Wray (2014) for Keynes’s role in the development of the state theory of money.  
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(Henry, 2011). The notion that the state is an agent that takes part in class conflict is not 
considered. Indeed, Keynes is “sure that the power of vested interests is vastly 
exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas” (1936, p. 383). If the 
class-neutral state implemented the appropriate approach to macroeconomic 
management, capitalism can survive in an improved condition. 
 Keynes’s theory of the state can be summarized as follows: the state is a crucial 
agent in capitalist society because it produces the money commodity, which is necessary 
for monetary production to take place. It corrects for the sub-optimal levels of investment 
due to deficient levels of effective demand in an uncertain future. If utilized correctly, it 
will ensure full employment. The neglect of an analysis of power relations in Keynes’s 
state theory is addressed, though not sufficiently, by the Post Keynesians, which will be 
discussed below.  
 
3.2 A Post Keynesian Theory of the State  
 
The post-Keynesian tradition has evolved from a theoretically heterogeneous, radical 
faction of Keynes’s students to a “coherent body of thought that is distinguished by its 
own theoretical perspectives” (Palley, 1996, p. 8). However, a theory of the state is 
conspicuously absent in the otherwise comprehensive post-Keynesian literature. Indeed, 
among all the works consulted for this thesis, only one deals directly with this subject: 
Pressman’s Alternative Theories of the State. Pressman describes a widely-received view 
of the state from a post-Keynesian perspective.  
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 Post Keynesians see the state as a “set of institutions working for the public good 
… an important economic player [that] provides laws and sets of regulations … [which] 
provide the necessary order for capitalist production to take place” (Pressman, 2006, pp. 
127-8).15 This is, notably, the only statement in Pressman that deals with the nature of the 
state as an economic agent. The assertion that the state necessarily works ‘for the public 
good’ is never substantiated or critically dealt with, even though Pressman briefly 
mentions Kalecki’s (1943) argument that the government would “serve the interests of 
the capitalist class” (Pressman, 2006, 130). The neglect of Kalecki’s insights by the Post 
Keynesians is dealt with in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 Post Keynesians have a vision of how they want the state to behave. They want it 
to behave as an uncertainty-reducing institution based on the principles of Keynes’s 
General Theory. They want it to be an institution that “ensures that everyone plays by the 
rules and provides public goods” (Pressman, 2006, p. 133). They want it to “ensure that 
requisite spending takes place, leading to full employment” because “if the state does not 
do this, no one else will” (ibid., p. 127). But as explained below, they do not have a 
vision of how it actually behaves. 
The primary theoretical difference between Keynes and the Post Keynesians 
regarding the state is the role of the institution of democratic government. Dow (2015) 
notes that because of the awareness that Keynes failed to implement his policies in spite 
of his access to the elite class of economists and politicians, “Post-Keynesians are … 
more attuned to the malign power of capital and political difficulties than [was] Keynes” 
                                                     
15 Several branches of post-Keynesianism state (Kaleckians, radical post-Keynesians, and others) do not 
fully accept this view, and actually appear to espouse something closer to a Marxian theory of the state. 
However, the Fundamentalist Post Keynesians seem to generally adhere to the theory of the state as 
described in this chapter (though usually this is not directly stated).   
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(p. 79). Democracy is important to Post Keynesians because citizens who vote in their 
interest enable the state to enact policies to “counter the power of the large firm,” which 
will “generate … economic growth that is shared by all citizens” (Pressman, 2006, p. 
134). This is in contrast with Keynes, who was deeply distrustful of democracy when 
considering economic issues: 
 
I believe that in the future, more than ever, questions about the economic 
framework of society will be far and away the most important political 
issues. I believe that the right solution will involve intellectual and scientific 
elements which must be above the heads of the vast mass of more or less 
illiterate voters. (Keynes, 1931, p. 324) 
 
While Post Keynesians may be ‘more attuned to political difficulty,’ Pressman 
argues that they still lack coherence in their class analysis and power analysis.16 Like 
Keynes, the Post Keynesians view the state as not beholden to the power struggle 
between economic classes, even if they recognize some form of class antagonism 
elsewhere in the economy. At most, Post Keynesians view the state as neutral in the class 
struggle. 
 To summarize, Post Keynesians implicitly view the state as the only agent 
capable of ameliorating capitalism’s flaws, specifically those relating to insufficient 
effective demand. The state acts as a countervailing power against that of the large firm, 
                                                     
16 Kalecki is an exception on this account. However, his class analysis is downplayed in the literature, in 
favor of his profits equation and other macroeconomic theoretical contributions (Lavoie, 2014; Palley, 
1995). Kalecki also differed widely from other Post Keynesians in his advocacy for democratic socialist 
planning (Toporowski, 2018).  
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while at the same time occupies a class-neutral space in the economy. Post Keynesians’ 
incorporation of the importance of democracy is certainly a theoretical sophistication 
over Keynes’s understanding of the state as the vessel of an enlightened elite. However, 
there are several deficiencies in this theory, which are addressed below. 
 
3.3 “Assuming our difficulties away” – Problems with Post Keynesian State Theory 
 
It is certainly possible that the state, if it were to act in the ways prescribed by Post 
Keynesians, would be an economic actor that eliminated unemployment. However, the 
nature of the state precludes it from acting in this way. The Post Keynesians are right to 
identify the state as an institution that saves capitalism from its own deficiencies, but this 
does not necessarily mean that it will act in a way that benefits ‘all citizens.’ The state 
must maintain and strengthen the institutions fundamental to capitalist production, and 
the particular way it does so depends on the specific historical needs of capitalist 
production (Kim, 2009). Thus, in response to a militant labor movement that threatened 
the foundations of capitalism, the state (however imperfectly) intervened using 
Keynesian policy to ameliorate unemployment during the so-called ‘golden age of 
capitalism.’ However, in the neoliberal period of the late 1970s, the needs of capital 
shifted; the deliberate increase in unemployment by the state, the evisceration of the 
welfare state, and the systematic attack on union power shows us that Keynesian policies 
are not able to mollify the class struggle in the long-term (this is dealt with in more detail 
in Chapter 5). The history of the twentieth century challenges the idea that the state exists 
above class antagonism. 
 34 
  There is also a contradiction between the idea that the state can at once be an 
arbiter of public good shared by ‘all citizens’ and also an agent that contends for power 
with other economic actors. The introduction of power dynamics into the Post Keynesian 
theory of the state implies that there are conflicting interests at play in the economy, and 
that the state is active in this power struggle. The notion that all citizens have, more or 
less, the same interests, obfuscates the fact that individuals occupy different class 
positions in the economy. State action benefits certain citizens, and classes, at the 
expense of others.   
 Post Keynesians assume certain characteristics of the state that do not take 
account of power and class dynamics, specifically when they posit that the state is a force 
for good for the whole of society. Contrary to epistemological realism, Post Keynesians 
have a liberal, class-neutral vision of the state.17 What’s more, Post Keynesians conflate 
the state with the government. Their focus on the institution of democracy overshadows 
the fact that the state is a large set of institutions, historically embedded and socially 
determined, that occupy a space within, not above, an economic system characterized by 
class antagonism. This precludes them from observing the disparities between how they 
want the state to behave and how it actually does. Indeed, Post Keynesians would benefit 
from Keynes’s own words; in their theory, the state acts how they “should like [it] to 
behave,” but to “assume that it actually does … is to assume our difficulties away” 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 34). The Marxian theory of the state, introduced below, is able to 
overcome this wishful thinking by providing a more robust analysis of the power 
structure of the state.  
                                                     
17 For an introduction to the philosophical and political foundations of Keynes and Keynesianism, see 
Mann (2017b).  
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3.4 Introduction to the Marxian Theory of the State 
 
In contrast with Keynes and the Post Keynesians, an explicit theory of the state is an 
important component of Marxian economic analysis. As will be elaborated below, the 
Marxian theory of the state is sophisticated both in its analysis of the nature of the state 
and its function in a capitalist society.  
 Though there has been disagreement among Marxists as to some particulars of the 
nature of the state,18 this thesis focuses on the generally accepted Marxian theory of the 
state, based primarily on the writings of Marx, Engels, and those Marxists that adhere 
most closely to their writings. From this perspective, the state is a historically established 
set of institutions (also referred to as the state apparatus) that takes its current form as a 
result of class antagonisms in order to “enforce and guarantee the stability of the class 
structure” and ensure social order (Sweezy, 1942, p. 134).  
 Marxists argue that the state arises at a certain point of the development of 
society, and the development of society is motivated by struggles between economic 
classes. Marx and Engels recognized that there is a difference between the state and 
government, though they saw a symbiotic relationship between these structures in a 
capitalist society. Societies have existed, and continue to exist, that do not have a state 
apparatus (as described below), but all human societies have had some form of 
government (Henry, 2008). In the following sections, I will delineate a Marxian theory of 
the state, first looking at its nature, and then its function in capitalist society.  
                                                     




3.5 The Nature of the State: Historical set of Institutions, Embedded in Class Struggle 
 
While a systematic Marxian theory of the state can be traced directly back to Engels, 
Marx clearly viewed the state as a multifaceted set of institutions, embedded in a society 
characterized by class conflict, that takes the side of the ruling class. In The Civil War in 
France, Marx describes the state as a “power with organs of standing army, policy 
bureaucracy, clergy, and judicature … which assume[s] … character of national power of 
capital over labor” ([1871] 1932, pp. 400-1). Marx’s inclusion of the clergy in his 
categorization of the state apparatus denotes his contention that the state acts to both 
physically and ideologically to coerce the working class. This point will be discussed 
further below.  
 Marx saw democratic government as an institution capable of acting in the 
interests of the working class. The capitalist state does not include this form of 
democracy; it is possible only if suffrage is truly universal and the representative 
government combines both legislative and executive authority. Democracy of this sort 
does not, nor has it ever, existed in the United States; the franchise has been plagued with 
racial and gender exclusion, campaign finance legislation that leads to disproportionate 
influence of the wealthy, and voter suppression. Similar to the societies that have already 
existed without the state, democratic government can exist under socialism even as the 
other institutions of the state apparatus are changed or dismantled (Henry, 2008).  
 Engels ([1884] 1972) wrote that the state “is a product of society at a certain stage 
of development … it is the admission that society has become entangled in an insoluble 
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contradiction with itself” (p. 159). That is, “the state is the product and the manifestation 
of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms” (Lenin, [1917] 1978, p. 8, italics added). 
The state emerges “in order that these antagonisms … may not consume themselves and 
society” (Engels, [1884] 1972, p. 160). Thus, like the liberal Keynesian approach, the 
state prevents societal collapse. However, the state is not a neutral arbiter of the class 
struggle where classes with conflicting interests reconcile and compromise; that view 
relies on the assumption of an “immutable … self-maintaining class structure of society” 
that Marxists reject (Sweezy, 1942, p. 241). This is impossible, because the state emerges 
specifically because the class struggle cannot be mediated (Lenin, [1917] 1978, p. 9). 
Because the class structure of a society is “defined and demarcated by a given set of 
property relations,” the state arises as the “guarantor of [these] property relations” 
(Sweezy, 1942, p. 242). Thus, we can summarize the state as “an instrument in the hands 
of the ruling classes for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the class structure 
itself” (ibid.) In so doing, it acts as agent of class domination (p. 243). Changing property 
relations throughout history led to the state taking corresponding forms: in Antiquity, the 
state was used to protect the property of masters at the expense of slaves. In feudal 
society, the state was the organ of ensuring the nobility maintained its property and 
dominance over the serfs. Likewise, under capitalism, the state acts to protect private 





3.6 The Function of the State: Guarantor of the Accumulation of Capital 
 
In sum, the state’s role in a capitalist economy as the protector of private property is one 
and the same as its role as an instrument of class domination (Sweezy, 1942). The 
capitalist class requires a state apparatus in order that the conditions for the “fundamental 
class process” of capital accumulation and surplus value extraction can be reproduced in 
historical time (Resnick and Wolff, 1987). The state, acting as instrument for the 
capitalist class, provides many prerequisite conditions for capital accumulation. In this 
section I will provide a cursory overview of the needs of capital, how the state acts to 
meet them. I will also describe the makeup of the several institutions within the state 
apparatus. It is worth restating here that the needs of capital shift as different stages of 
capitalism are reached and different historical and economic circumstances emerge. The 
state reacts by changing its policies and institutional arrangements to meet the ever-
changing needs of capital.  
 As Marx states, “the capital-relation presupposes a complete separation between 
the workers and the ownership of the conditions for the realization of their labor” ([1867] 
1990, p. 874). The state first supplied the preconditions for capitalist accumulation 
through violent land seizure in what Marx called ‘primitive accumulation.’ Labor, newly 
‘freed’ from their property and way of existence, became available to capitalists, and 
capitalism was able to proliferate. Once this initial step was completed, the state 
continued to play an active role in ensuring the continuation of the ‘capital-relation.’  
The fundamental class process of capital accumulation is the foundation of the 
capitalist economy. Marx schematized this in his ‘circuit of capital,’ M-C-P-C-M, where 
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money (M) is used by capitalists to purchase commodities (C), the means of production 
and labor-power, which are utilized production (P) to create more commodities (C), 
greater in value than when it entered. The value of these new commodities is realized in 
the money form by the sale of such commodities (M) (Marx, [1884] 1992). The capitalist 
class requires a regulated supply of the two commodities, labor-power and money, in 
order to continuously complete the circuit of capital and reproduce the capital 
accumulation process in historical time (de Brunhoff, 1976). The state participates in this 
process by assisting in the supply of these commodities. The state’s role in supplying the 
money-commodity for the capital accumulation process is not considered in this thesis 
(see de Brunhoff, 1976, for a full explanation), but the role of the state in regulating the 
supply of labor-power will be examined below.  
Capitalist accumulation requires the “continuous presence of three elements – 
work discipline, insecurity of employment, and a permanent supply of proletarian labor-
power costing as little as possible” (de Brunhoff, 1976, p. 11). The state’s role in 
regulating these elements makes it an active agent in capitalist accumulation. Recall from 
Chapter 2 of this thesis that capital requires an industrial reserve army, “a mass of human 
material always ready for exploitation by capital in the interest of capital’s own changing 
valorization requirements” (Marx, [1867] 1990, p. 785). The state becomes responsible 
for maintaining this population in order that it is ready to be used as a source of labor-
power. 
The state apparatus is made up of a range of institutions that act to provide a 
disciplined, precarious, and permanent supply of labor-power. Access to labor-power was 
once provided by poor-houses in the 19th century, and these institutions were replaced by 
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the welfare state of the mid-20th century. The modern welfare state was put in place 
during time of great civil unrest in order to preserve the class structure of society (see 
Chapter 5 of this thesis); the interests of those outside of the ruling capitalist class can 
benefit from state action if it means preserving existing property relations and social 
order. Importantly, in both the poor-house and the welfare state, the insecurity of work is 
maintained, thus work-discipline remains intact for those who are employed (de 
Brunhoff, 1978, p.10). The capitalist class would not instate reforms that would lead to a 
significant curtailment of the supply of cheap labor-power, except under extreme pressure 
to its class dominance.  
The capitalist system requires “not only political hegemony, but ideological 
hegemony” in order to reproduce the conditions of its existence (Althusser, 2001, p. 96). 
Thus, the institutions of the state apparatus engage in activity that politically and 
ideologically legitimizes the dominance of the capitalist class. These institutions include 
government, the legal system, the army, the prison system, and the schools. A democratic 
government performs the ideological function of legitimating the capitalist class process 
by appearing to ratify it every election cycle. The legal system dictates the length of the 
working day and other conditions of labor. The prison system punishes transgressions 
against private property. The school system educates the proletariat to be a skilled, 
obedient workforce. Of course, there are a myriad of other functions and institutions 
within the state apparatus, and this list is incomplete and simplified. It is clear, however, 
that any analysis that conflates the ‘government’ with the ‘state’ is lacking in its 
understanding of the multifaceted nature of the state apparatus and the roles of its 




Marxists and Post Keynesians agree that the state is required in some capacity to sustain a 
capitalist economy. Post Keynesian theory stresses the function of the state, without 
articulating the nature of the state. This leads them to ontologically conflate the 
government with the state. In contrast, Marxian state theory provides a class-based 
analysis of the state’s nature as well as its function. Post Keynesians wish the state to be 
that which it is not. That is to say, the benevolent and enlightened agent that preserves 
capitalism by ameliorating its intrinsic flaws and staving off its collapse. For Post 
Keynesians, the state exists outside of the historical class struggle and works to benefit 
society as a whole. Marxists recognize the state as a historically embedded set of 
institutions that may “appear to stand above society” (Engels, [1884] 1972, p. 159). But 
in reality, the state is a “product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class 
antagonisms” (Lenin, [1917] 1978, p. 8) that inevitably takes the side of the ruling class. 
The failure of Post Keynesianism to have a thorough theory of the state undermines their 
political project of implementing policies that would eliminate unemployment and save 
capitalism from its intrinsic flaws — the employer of last resort policy rests on dubious 




IV. The Employer of Last Resort Policy Proposal: Ambitions and Obstacles 
 
The fundamentalist Post Keynesians center the work of Keynes as the foundation of their 
economic theory and policy. A cornerstone of their analysis is the notion that the state is 
capable of ameliorating an intrinsic flaw of capitalist economies by ensuring full 
employment through direct, ‘on-the-spot’ job creation (Tcherneva, 2014).19 The employer 
of last resort (ELR) program is the policy that Post Keynesians believe is most capable of 
achieving this goal. The ELR, the Post Keynesians argue, would effectively end 
involuntary unemployment, because the government would directly provide a job to 
anyone willing and able to work. The ELR proposal is inspired by the employment 
programs of the New Deal, and is the basis for a recent unemployment program 
implemented in Argentina. In the United States, an insurgent progressive political 
movement has led to an increase in popularity of the idea that the federal government 
ought to provide a ‘Job Guarantee’ (Krieg, 2018). This has led to a debate in the 
academic and public spheres regarding the merits of an array of Job Guarantee proposals. 
In the midst of this discussion, Post Keynesians have developed and refined their ELR 
proposal. Here I will examine the theory of the ELR and discuss the historical application 
of government employment programs. I will then present critiques of the ELR put forth 
by some Post Keynesians. I conclude the chapter by agreeing with many of the criticisms 
of the ELR. My main argument is that while the ambitions of the ELR are noble and just, 
                                                     
19 As mentioned in the introduction, the term ‘full employment’ has several meanings, used by different 
economists and politicians for specific uses and to serve specific agendas. In this chapter, the term is used 
mean a situation in which there is no involuntary unemployment – that is, anyone willing and able to work 
is employed, either by the private sector, public sector, or by an ELR job – or there is, in Keynes’s words, 
‘less-than-one percent unemployment’ in peacetime (Tcherneva, 2014; Keynes, 1980).  
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the ELR proposal as it stands is internally contradictory. It is not impossible that a 
program similar to the ELR could be implemented in the United States, but would not 
achieve all of the stated goals of the current proposal. 
 
4.1 The Design of the ELR20  
 
The ELR, as it is currently proposed, was schematized by Minsky ([1986] 2008) as a 
permanent direct employment program, modeled on a version of the New Deal’s Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC), Works Progress Administration (WPA), and National Youth 
Administration (NYA).21 Minsky built on Keynes’s (1936) argument in the General 
Theory that the state was the only agent capable of offsetting a capitalist economy’s 
inability and of achieving full employment. This is because the state, not beholden to the 
profit expectations of private firms, “can divorce the offering of employment from the 
profitability of hiring workers” (Minsky, [1986] 2008, p. 308). In order to promote 
stability and full employment, Minsky schematized the ELR as a part of a set of policies 
and institutions considered together under the heading of ‘big government.’ Minsky’s 
analysis took the changing nature of institutions and the evolution of the economy into 
account. His ELR proposal was malleable, ready to adjust to changing conditions (Wray, 
2007). The ELR has since been developed by several Post Keynesian economists into a 
robust set of policy proposals. While there is some discrepancy among the ELR 
                                                     
20 The scholarship on the ELR has grown to a vast number over the past twenty years. The scope of this 
thesis necessitates an omission of some of the particulars of the divergent visions for the program. The 
interested reader can consult Tcherneva (2018) and Kaboub (2007), who provide comprehensive outlines of 
the ELR. It also should be noted that the architects of the ELR intentionally leave some particulars open-
ended, since they intend the program to be malleable to changing economic conditions. However, this 
vagueness has also sparked a considerable amount of criticism for the ELR, as will be discussed below.  
21 There exist a few ELR proposals that predate Minsky—see Tcherneva (2012b).  
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proposals, there is a general consensus among its proponents on the theory behind the 
policy proposal. The proposals differ in that they adjust for specific economic and 
political issues in their  implementation (Kaboub, 2007). This chapter addresses the 
differences when relevant, but generally presents the ELR as a unified policy proposal. I 
begin with a brief introduction to Modern Monetary Theory, which is the basis for the 
funding of the ELR program.  
 The ELR proposal is predicated on a synthesis of Lerner’s (1943) concept of 
‘functional finance’ and the chartalist approach to money, known as ‘Modern Monetary 
Theory’ (MMT). MMT theorists argue that all state spending needs to be considered only 
in terms of its results, not its costs, because the state has the power to determine what is 
accepted as money. Under this rubric, taxation, government debt borrowing or 
repayment, and money printing are all carried out after fiscal activity has taken place, in 
order to regulate spending.22 This is, of course, in stark contrast with the generally 
accepted mainstream notion that taxes fund government expenditure. The limit to state 
monetary action in this framework is not arbitrary deficit or debt ratios but the extent to 
which said action contributes to real productivity and wealth creation (Wray, 2014, p. 
31). Thus, many proponents of the ELR program are not concerned with how it will be 
paid for, but rather with how its implementation can achieve its goal of massively 
curtailing unemployment.23  
                                                     
22 Murray (2017) is an exception to the rule; he models a budget-neutral ELR program, fully financed out 
of government revenues.  
23 Much has been written in the literature about MMT, and further engagement with this topic escapes the 
purview of this thesis. See Lerner (1943) for an introduction to functional finance, Wray (1998, 2012) and 
Juniper, Sharpe, & Watts (2014) for theoretical contributions and criticisms of MMT. I agree with the 
tenants of MMT, and this thesis will assume that MMT can conceptually work and facilitate an ELR 
program. However, I disagree with its proponents’ contention that simply convincing the elites to accept 
MMT will lead to its adoption. More on this in Chapter 5.  
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The ELR program is currently devised as a permanent, federal job guarantee that 
directly offers a job to anyone who is willing and able to work at a given base wage, 
which at present is proposed as $15 per hour with benefits that including include health 
insurance, childcare, paid leave, and retirement (Tcherneva, 2018).24 This would establish 
an exogenously determined ‘wage floor’ that would effectively become the minimum 
wage (Kaboub, 2007). The ELR is specifically intended to be distinct from existing 
private and public sector jobs, hence the ‘last resort’ in its title. Yet if a worker can find 
no employment in the private sector, they would be able to immediately find a living-
wage job with the government.  
Because workers would not supplant existing private sector jobs, the size of the 
ELR population would swell during depressions and shrink during booms. The ELR thus 
acts as a ‘buffer-stock’ employment program; the price of labor is stabilized because it is 
‘sold’ when its price is rising and ‘bought’ when the price is falling. In a capitalist 
economy that does not have an ELR, inflation is kept in check by the ‘reserve army’ of 
unemployed (see Chapter 2 of this thesis) — employers fire workers in recessions, and 
hire in booms. Under the ELR, prices are stabilized not by unemployment, but by a 
population of employed workers (Mitchell, 1998). This means that the ELR projects need 
to have a fluctuating number of workers at any given point, and need to be discontinued 
if the private sector demand for labor gets to a high enough level (more on this below). 
Macroeconomic stability would increase as business cycle fluctuations are dampened, 
because workers who lose their jobs during economic downturns can always rely on ELR 
jobs with a living wage; and hence consumption would not fall as sharply as it would. 
                                                     
24 This is, notably, more than double the current federal minimum wage in the United States, which is at 
time of writing $7.25 an hour, without any benefits (US Department of Labor, 2018).  
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Additionally, the increase in government spending due to the increased number of 
workers on the government payroll decreases the decline in aggregate economic activity 
during a recession. Likewise, in an economic upturn, government spending would 
decrease.  
While the program is federally funded, it would be locally administered 
(Tcherneva, 2018). Local and municipal governments, as well as nonprofits and 
cooperative enterprises, would create jobs according to the specific needs of the local 
communities. The ELR program would bring the jobs directly to where they are most 
needed; most jobs will be created where there are the highest levels of unemployment. 
While the exact nature of the work is not specified in the ELR proposals, the jobs made 
available “would be designed to be productive, providing socially valuable output and 
services, such as public infrastructure development and maintenance, public services for 
youth and aged persons, environmental and public space enhancement, and so on” (Wray, 
1998, p. 16). Some proposed examples of ELR jobs include park maintenance and 
renewal, sustainable agricultural practice and urban farms, cleanup of vacant properties, 
restoration of public spaces, recycling and reuse initiatives, and apprenticeships in 
education such as teacher-aides and after-school programs. The implementation of the 
specific jobs will be decided by local ELR authorities and adapted over time — “some 
trial and error, experimentation, and ongoing improvements will be necessary for the 
program’s long-run success” (Tcherneva, 2018, p. 47). 
Under an ELR regime, those who are not employed by the private sector receive 
what is tantamount to paid job training by engaging in productive labor that enhances 
their skills. This increases their ‘human capital’ and renders them more attractive 
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candidates for the private sector (Wray, 1998). In this way, the ELR program is seen as a 
transitional program (for the individual workers it employs); it is a “stepping stone to 
paid work – from unemployment to employment or from [ELR] employment to other 
forms of private, public, and nonprofit employment” (Tcherneva, 2018, p. 5).  
ELR advocates expect that the program would lead to the displacement of 
undesirable jobs (that pay below a living wage, or do not provide benefits) because 
private employers would have to match the base pay established by ELR jobs. They also 
foresee the ELR as a mechanism that ameliorates poverty as well as inequality because it 
raises the incomes of the lower income brackets without doing the same for the wealthy. 
Additionally, the ELR has the potential to curtail a myriad of psychological and social ills 
caused by unemployment such as depression and crime (Darity, 1999; Tcherneva, 2017). 
The ELR program also provides an opportunity to address environmental concerns 
(Forstater, 2004). Whereas Minsky ([1986] 2008) viewed the ELR as a replacement for 
welfare, current ELR schemes are now conceived to be supplemental to a robust welfare 
state (Kaboub, 2007). The ELR is not designed as ‘workfare’; it does not require people 
to work for existing benefits such as Medicare, SNAP, etc. (Tcherneva, 2018). Likewise, 
ELR is not seen as a panacea; there are other social issues that ELR advocates understand 
as having separate policy solutions. Finally, ELR advocates appeal to the morality of 
human rights: they arguing that the ELR would fulfill the call of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and Martin Luther King Jr. that a guaranteed job contributes to the broad goal of social 
and economic justice (Forstater, 2002).   
In the next section, we look at two examples of existing direct government 
employment programs and their outcomes. The first is the primary inspiration for 
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contemporary ELR programs: The New Deal. The second is a modern government 
employment program inspired by a team of scholars affiliated with the Levy Institute, 
Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desempleados.  
 
4.2 Precursors to the ELR - Existing Government Employment Programs 
 
The only large-scale direct government employment programs ever utilized in the United 
States were those implemented during the New Deal, which included the Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC), Works Progress Administration (WPA), and National Youth 
Administration (NYA). The New Deal was a response to the Great Depression, the worst 
economic crisis in the history of global capitalism. In 1929, the average unemployment 
rate was 3.2 percent. Four years later, the unemployment rate had risen to 25.2 percent. If 
only non-farm employees are counted, unemployment rose from 5.3 percent in 1929 to 
36.3 percent in 1932 (Bureau of the Census, 1975, p. 232). In order to address this 
astronomical level of unemployment, and the increasing social unrest that accompanied 
it, the federal government directly employed millions of those who were unable to find 
work.25  
 The employment programs featured a wide array of public works projects and 
were implemented in a matter of months. Between 1933 and 1937, unemployment fell by 
over 10 percent as many of the unemployed were recruited into the programs (Tymoigne, 
                                                     
25 While many of its critics accused the New Deal of creeping socialism (Hayek’s Road to Serfdom may be 
the most famous example), many programs were crafted and advertised as precisely the opposite. The 
Roosevelt administration wanted to “get the economy moving … and return to normalcy” (Badger, 2008, p. 
37), all in order to defend a weakened capitalist order from socialist (and fascist) advances. In particular, 
young unemployed men were believed to be particularly drawn to radicalism and thus seen as a threat to 
society – the CCC and NYA were marketed as a way to combat this threat (Henry, 2018). This will be dealt 
with in further detail in the next chapter.  
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2013). Over 13 million jobs were created as a part of the WPA alone (Tcherneva, 2018). 
As Taylor (2009) argues and many others have observed, the job programs created an 
immense array of infrastructure, cultural, and civic structures that are still in use until this 
day. Parks were designed and constructed, buildings were rebuilt, post offices and 
libraries were built, and numerous roads and bridges were constructed.26  
Unlike modern ELR proposals, New Deal programs were limited in scope; they 
were conceived as emergency programs, intended to be short-lived. At the time, the 
prevailing economic wisdom was that the problem of massive unemployment would 
correct itself in a short period of time (Tymoigne, 2014). Upon winning reelection in 
1936, the Roosevelt administration slashed the budgets for the New Deal Jobs programs 
in the pursuit of balanced budgets, and this led to the downturn of 1938. What’s more, the 
New Deal was, from its inception, fought against tooth and nail by business interests, 
which led to a lack of funding, discriminatory hiring practices, and curtailed the amount 
of success the programs were able to achieve (Henry, 2018).  
To conclude, while not technically an ELR program as defined in modern terms, 
the New Deal was the spiritual predecessor to current government employment proposals 
in that it involved the direct employment of unemployed workers by the federal 
government in projects that were socially useful. Though it was flawed in both its 
conception and execution, it showed that the government was able, under certain 
historical and economic conditions, to directly give jobs to the unemployed on a massive 
scale. Proponents of the ELR today almost unanimously cite the New Deal employment 
programs as both a source of inspiration for their schemes as well as evidence that it is 
                                                     
26 UC Berkeley maintains an interactive map of the lasting achievements of the New Deal jobs programs at 
https://livingnewdeal.org/map/. The site gives perspective of the truly monumental impact across the entire 
United States.  
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politically and structurally possible to implement in the United States (e.g., Tcherneva, 
2018; Forstater, 2004). These claims will be dealt with below.  
As previously mentioned, there is no historical precedent for an ELR program that 
possesses all of the characteristics advocated by the Post Keynesians. That being said, 
there are isolated examples of large-scale employment programs among developing 
nations that possess some characteristics of the ELR, which have been dealt with in detail 
elsewhere in the literature (Murray and Forstater, 2013; Sturgess, 2016). For the purpose 
of this thesis, I find it relevant to discuss the only program directly modeled off the 
proposals of ELR advocates: Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desempleados 
(henceforth referred to as ‘Plan Jefes’) (Tcherneva, 2013).  
Economic conditions in Argentina in 2002 were similar to that of the United 
States in 1929; the unemployment rate in May of that year was 25 percent. Economic and 
political instability precipitated years of massive protest in the streets, which were met 
with violence by the police. This resulted in many casualties, and this led to in the erosion 
of popular support for the government (Kostzer, 2008). Politicians could not walk outside 
without facing harassment, and the protests eventually forced the economic minister and 
the president out of office (Tcherneva, 2013). Compelled by social unrest, the new 
president, Eduardo Duhalde, implemented Plan Jefes by executive decree in 2002.  
Kostzer (2008) translates and summarizes the main points of the decree:27  
 
Due to the present economic and financial juncture of Argentina, ... , [the 
government] declares the state of social, economic, administrative crisis”; ... the 
                                                     
27 Text of the original decree can be found here: 
http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/73272/norma.htm  
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country has reached levels of extreme poverty aggravated by productive paralysis, 
it is mandatory to take measures to alleviate the difficult situation that is facing an 
important sector of the population; … and There is the need to establish an 
entitlement for family inclusion to all unemployed heads of household ... 
warranting a minimum monthly income to all Argentinean families. (pp. 17-18, 
emphasis added) 
 
The program, like the New Deal, was in response to an economy-wide crisis and was 
conceived of as an emergency response to that crisis. The social safety net in Argentina 
was drastically curtailed to shift funding to this new program (Tcherneva and Wray, 
2005). Of particular interest is the fact that the decree specifically calls for a guaranteed 
income, not a job per se, to its beneficiaries. This point will be brought up again later. 
 By the end of 2002, there were over 2 million beneficiaries of Plan Jefes. While 
the program was nationally funded and administered, the works projects put in place by 
the program were managed by “local governments, NGOs, or grassroots organizations 
that submitted the list of beneficiaries to the Ministry of Labor in order to pay them” 
(Kostzer, 2008, p. 18). Plan Jefes payed 150 pesos per month (a level below the 
minimum wage) to a head of household for a minimum of four hours of daily work 
(Tcherneva, 2013). The majority of the jobs created were in community projects such as 
the maintenance of buildings, cleaning public spaces, engaging in community services 
such as child care and soup kitchens, but there were also opportunities for program 
beneficiaries to go back to school, participate in vocational training, or start their own 
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enterprise (Kostzer, 2008). It should be noted, however, that reeducation and vocational 
training made up a total of only 10 percent of the beneficiaries of the program.   
The program directly targeted the least skilled individuals in the country and 
protected them against abject poverty (Gallaso and Ravallion, 2004). Many services 
provided by Plan Jefes jobs were already provided by private or public sector jobs, but 
these were unavailable to poor communities due to prohibitive costs or lack of access to 
low-income areas (Kostzer, 2008).  
 Plan Jefes was implemented as a temporary solution to a specific historical 
economic crisis in Argentina. The program was eliminated in 2006, due to the fact that 
the Argentinian economy saw steady economic recovery from the time the program was 
begun in 2002 (Kostzer, 2008). While the extent of the role of Plan Jefes in the recovery 
is contested, there can be no doubt that it played a positive part in the recovery. 
Unemployment in Argentina went from over 3 million in 2003 down to 1.3 million in 
2006 (ibid.). Over 750,000 of the program’s beneficiaries were reinserted into the labor 
market during the duration of the program. Women were disproportionately employed by 
the program. Tcherneva (2013) notes that the work provided by the program was a source 
of empowerment and freedom for women that combatted Argentina’s economic and 
cultural gender disparities. Surveys conducted showed that female participants preferred 
working to receiving a check of equal amount (ibid.).28  
 While Plan Jefes possessed several characteristics of an ELR program, it differed 
in many important ways. Most prominently, it was not considered to be a permanent 
program to counter the inability of the capitalist system to provide full employment. It 
                                                     
28 While I find the role of gender to be an important consideration for heterodox economics, specifically 
when considering its relation to unemployment, further discussion on this issue escapes the bounds of this 
thesis. The interested reader is directed towards Todorova (2009).  
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also did not offer employment to all who were willing and able to work. However, it 
directly hired workers ‘as they are’ to do socially useful work, and to a very limited 
capacity, enhanced the ‘human capital’ of a minority of the beneficiaries through training 
and education. ELR advocates point to this program as evidence that an ELR program is 
workable in the United States today. In the next section, I assess the plausibility of that 
claim, and address several critiques of the ELR from the post-Keynesian perspective.  
 
4.3 Post-Keynesian Critiques of the ELR 
 
There have been several critiques of the ELR made by post-Keynesians (Sawyer, 2003, 
2005; Seccareccia 2004; Sturgess 2016). This section surveys the most common and 
recurring of these critiques, which generally consists of concerns regarding (1) the costs 
of the program, (2) its economic impact, and (3) the nature of the jobs it provides 
(Sturgess, 2016). In this section, I will engage most thoroughly with the criticisms that I 
find to be most persuasive, to which the ELR advocates provide unconvincing responses. 
I will add my own criticisms where applicable. It will be concluded that, even within the 
logic of post-Keynesianism, the ELR is incapable of achieving all of its myriad goals 
(described above), because several of the goals are incompatible with each other; the 
ELR is internally contradictory based on its own theoretical foundations.  
Before discussion of the selected critiques I find convincing, I will briefly 
mention of those that will not be meaningfully addressed here. First, we will ignore 
considerations of cost, hesitantly accepting the tenants of MMT and the premise that the 
ELR will pay for itself as outlined above. Concerns regarding the ELR’s effect on wage 
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bargaining will be dealt with in the next chapter. The question of stigmatization of ELR 
workers (Tymoigne, 2013) is not discussed here because in the United States, it is 
impossible to know how ELR workers would be received by the general public – the 
continuously shifting and polarized political landscape may look very different by the 
time something resembling the ELR would hypothetically go into effect. Another 
criticism not considered is Sawyer’s (2003) argument that the ELR would create 
prohibitively inefficient jobs. I share Wray’s (2015) view that the point of any public 
sector work is specifically to provide socially useful goods and services that would 
otherwise not be provided by the efficiency imperative of the private sector.29 Finally, 
there is a concern regarding price stability over time. Sawyer (2003, p. 903) argues that 
ELR architects have failed to address the reality that the base-wage of the program either 
has to adjust over time to respond to transitions in the prevailing wage rate in the market 
(among other political and economic factors), abandoning its role as price stabilizer, or 
the base-wage will sooner or later be reduced to a poverty wage. While we address issues 
with the buffer-stock aspect of the ELR, this specific problem is omitted in order to keep 
this thesis concise. These and other concerns can be found elsewhere in the literature.   
Critics of the ELR have expressed skepticism regarding the types of jobs 
proposed for the beneficiaries of the program. By design, ELR jobs need to be unskilled 
and require little training, but also need to perform some socially beneficial role that is 
not to be considered make-work required to receive an income. Specifying the type of job 
that would meet this criterion is difficult, and ELR advocates have struggled to 
adequately address this issue. Wray’s (1998) list of potential ELR jobs include 
                                                     
29 This is not to say that the value created by ELR jobs should not be considered at all. Several issues arise 
when decoupling employment from productivity. That jobs provide social benefits and are not simply 
‘make-work’ is crucial to the ELR program. This is discussed below.  
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“companions to the elderly and orphans, the bedridden, and the mentally or physically 
disabled … public classroom assistants … and day care assistants” (pp. 142-3), while 
Forstater (2005) suggests that ELR programs could include large-scale infrastructure 
projects as well as education aides. These suggestions are problematic for several 
reasons. The first is that care and education-related jobs are erroneously assumed to be 
low-skilled and are thus undervalued by the ELR advocates (Sturgess, 2016). Existing 
education and care work requires high levels of education, which a majority of ELR 
workers are unlikely to possess. Additionally, work in these fields requires a considerable 
amount of time-consuming background checks and screening that would delay the 
implementation of these jobs. Finally, large-scale infrastructure jobs are high-skilled, not 
to mention dangerous for both the workers and the citizens that would utilize the public 
structures built by low-skilled ELR laborers.  
A lack of adequate response to these criticisms has led the ELR advocates to 
become vaguer regarding the specifics of the jobs provided by the program. Tcherneva’s 
(2018) list of potential jobs includes park cleanup, building restoration, urban gardening, 
and teacher aides (though she largely leaves the specification of jobs up to the local 
agencies tasked with the provision of these jobs). Again, the idea that teacher aides would 
be low-skilled or would be able to be implemented quickly is not only incorrect, it 
devalues the very type of work Tcherneva intends to support and encourage. What 
remains, after all concerns are addressed, is a short list of relatively unproductive make-
work, like picking up trash in parks, which could only be a supplement to already 
existing public sector work. These jobs are limited in their capacity to be personally 
‘fulfilling,’ and they do not provide a useful service or contribute to the employability of 
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the ELR worker. If work like this is still required to receive the income from the program, 
it is hard to not view this as tantamount to a labor requirement for welfare.  
A core internal contradiction within the ELR scheme stems from its usage of 
labor as a buffer-stock. Recall that under this premise, labor is a perfectly flexible 
commodity; this necessitates that workers in theory enter and leave the program 
instantaneously in response to demand for labor in the private sector. This is a 
cornerstone of the ELR proposal (which promises full employment and price stability). 
However, ELR proponents believe that the jobs provided to ELR beneficiaries have the 
potential to be so meaningful and offer noneconomic benefits so compelling that they 
might prefer to stay in the program rather than find employment elsewhere. Tcherneva 
(2018) writes that “[i]t is possible that some people will find the local, living-wage 
community job to be their dream job. The [ELR] welcomes them” (p. 48). She notes that 
if this is the case then they might be transitioned to permanent public sector work, but she 
stops short of providing a detailed explanation as to how such a transition would work. 
This gives credence to Tymoigne’s (2013) argument that perhaps labor is not a good unit 
for use as buffer-stock because it is non-homogenous – that is, workers do not behave in 
the same way when met with economic stimuli.  
Additionally, Tcherneva (2018, p. 48) admits that there is friction between 
workers finding jobs and exiting from in the ELR – those workers who have trouble 
rejoining the private sector would be remunerated for their job search (see also Wray, 
1998). But Tcherneva does not mention how that will affect the buffer-stock aspect of the 
program. She deflects from this point by noting that “the ability to absorb or shed 
employees is not a unique challenge for the [ELR] …. Indeed, every labor market 
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segment within the private, nonprofit, or public sectors deals with new entrants and job 
leavers on an ongoing basis” (Tcherneva. 2018, p. 11). While this is true, neither the 
private, nonprofit, nor public sectors claim to be a buffer-stock program like the ELR 
does. The burden of proof rests on the ELR advocates to provide a reconciliation of the 
realities of frictional unemployment and the buffer-stock component of their policy 
proposal. The proposal to aid workers looking to exit the program with job searches is 
simply a state of unemployment by another name.30 Additionally, the ELR cannot 
instantaneously provide jobs for workers when they exit the private job market. Even if 
the work is labor-intensive, as Forstater (2005) argues, the programs still require 
administration, the provision of a certain amount of capital equipment, which would lead 
to delays in the provision of jobs, and thus act as impediment to the buffer stock (Sawyer, 
2003).  
Another issue presented by the buffer-stock component of the ELR is that jobs 
cannot be at the same time ‘socially necessary’ and also subject to the (sometimes 
drastic) fluctuations in the labor market. If a job provides a meaningful public service, 
then it should not be abandoned when there is a high level of demand for labor in the 
private sector. The buffer-stock aspect of the program precludes the planning necessary 
for any large-scale or ongoing public works or services projects that advocates outline as 
job sources for the ELR, as discussed above. Tcherneva (2012a) writes that “the 
overriding objective of [ELR program jobs] would be to put those individuals whom the 
private sector has declined to employ into socially useful projects that fill some unmet 
public need” (pp. 3-4). But if the population of the ELR fluctuates with the business 
                                                     
30 Helping the unemployed find jobs is, of course, a positive endeavor that ought to be performed by some 
economic agent. But the recipients of that service are still unemployed and this situation is not consistent 
with the full employment claims of the ELR.  
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cycle, how can something deemed to be a ‘public need’ be adequately and consistently 
provisioned? There has not been adequate response to this by the advocates of the ELR. 
If, say, we determine that elderly care is a social good that should be regularly provided 
(the concerns above notwithstanding), then the last thing we would want is for the 
provision of that care to be subject to regular ebb and flow of the business cycle. As 
Sturgess (2016) notes, because of the buffer stock aspect of the ELR, “it must be 
ultimately a matter of indifference whether the job is performed or not … most social 
needs are ongoing, so should not be addressed through short-term jobs provided in 
countercyclical fashion” (p. 42).  
There is also an issue with the training aspect of the ELR. Skill development 
through training is an important benefit to ELR work (and a crucial rebuttal to the claim 
that ELR is make-work or workfare), but the buffer stock aspect of the program puts at 
risk the ability of ELR employees to complete a discrete level of training. The alternative 
to this, as Kadmos and O’Hara (2000) point out, is that workers perform low-
responsibility, routine work that either amounts to unemployment by another name, or 
serious underemployment with no chance of meaningful skill development.  
The non-economic benefits of labor such as a sense of accomplishment or purpose 
and involvement in community are only gained if the worker’s skills are being utilized 
and that they are rewarded for it (Tymoigne, 2013). The buffer-stock aspect of the ELR is 
in direct conflict with a majority of the social benefits envisioned by the ELR architects. 
This is why the ELR cannot achieve the types of accomplishments that the New Deal 
jobs programs achieved, contrary to what Forstater (2004) and others argue; the New 
Deal programs, finite and discrete in nature, were able to be planned and executed 
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because they were able to rely on a stable number of workers, since the pool of 
unemployed was so enormous at the time.  
Another critique of the ELR program is that it conflicts with existing public sector 
unemployment in a way that hurts existing workers and also provides sub-par services 
and devalues important and necessary work (Sawyer, 2005). In America, there is 
certainly an under-provision of important social goods and services, not to mention a 
paucity of measures being taken to address climate change. But as Sturgess (2016) 
argues, “[i]t seems perverse to respond to an under-provision of physical, social and 
cultural infrastructure by establishing an entirely different form of public-sector labour — 
the [ELR] — that would use under-skilled, under-paid workers instead of well-paid and 
trained workers” (p. 50). In an economy in which the health care, social care, and 
education sectors will make up an increasingly large percentage of the job market 
(Delong, 2016), leaving the provision of these services to employees who make at most 
$15 an hour (the highest proposed ELR wage among the myriad schemes proposed so 
far), would prove disastrous for teachers, healthcare providers, and the recipients of those 
services. One of the many ways this could manifest is the following: if ELR jobs are 
similar to existing public sector jobs, the ELR employees would pose a threat to the 
existing public sector workers. There would be an incentive by the government to 
substitute the lower-wage ELR workers for the relatively high-wage permanent public 
servants (Seccareccia, 2004, p. 33).  
One final critique of the ELR is related to the claim that providing work of any 
kind is generally better than simply receiving an income (Sawyer, 2003; Tymoigne, 
2013). As previously mentioned, if jobs are not meaningful or do not contribute to society 
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in some way, it’s hard to imagine there being a strong amount of positive noneconomic 
benefit to merely having a job. This begs the question of if the ELR is preferable to 
giving people a guaranteed basic income. ELR advocates have referenced Plan Jefes as a 
proof that workers prefer having a job to merely having an income, but it is hardly clear 
that the specific cultural and socioeconomic conditions in Argentina in 2002 are 
universal, or applicable in the United States.31 In spite of the program being influenced by 
ELR advocates at the Levy Economics Institute, it is unclear if it was intended to be an 
income program with a work requirement or a work program per se (Kostzer, 2008). 
While it is beyond the purview of this thesis to delve further into this issue, I argue that 
the notion that work is preferable to a guaranteed income is inadequately defended by the 
ELR architects, given the barriers to providing meaningful employment that the ELR 
faces.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
 
The ELR cannot reliably be at once a buffer-stock stabilizing program and a generator of 
meaningful employment that provides socially necessary goods and services. In order for 
an employment program to work, the government needs to identify social needs, create 
projects, and see them through to the end (like the New Deal). There are categorical 
differences between the New Deal, Plan Jefes, and the ELR; the successes of these 
existing government employment programs do not demonstrate the workability of the 
                                                     
31 Further issues regarding the comparison of the ELR to the New Deal and Plan Jefes will be discussed in 
the next chapter.   
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ELR today. I agree that there are plenty of socially useful work projects that are sorely 
needed, but the ELR is not the way to accomplish them. 
 In addition to all of the issues with the implementation of the ELR and the 
internal contradictions in the stated goals of the policy proposal, there are political 
barriers to the maintenance of full employment, if it were to be achieved. The next 
chapter deals with these considerations, building on Kalecki’s (1943) political concerns 
regarding full employment. As argued in Chapter 3, the post-Keynesian theory of the 
state lacks the cohesion and thoroughness that of Marxian political economy, and this 
weakness limits the ELR advocates’ appraisal of the obstacles to realizing their policy 












V. A Marxian Critique of the ELR 
 
The Post Keynesians behind the employer of last resort policy (ELR) argue that their 
economic agenda will lead to sustained full employment. Meanwhile, Marxists generally 
agree that capitalism cannot accommodate the institutional changes necessary for the 
maintenance of full employment.32 This is due to the fact that unemployment serves a 
purpose (its aforementioned ‘class function’) in capital accumulation; it is a lever by 
which the capitalist class uses its position as owner of the means of production to subdue 
the working class through fear of unemployment and wage suppression (Marx, [1867] 
1990, p. 792). In the previous chapter, I critically analyzed the employer of last resort 
(ELR) from the Post Keynesian perspective; here I add to these criticisms by examining 
the ELR from the Marxian perspective, which focuses on class and power dynamics 
downplayed by many Post Keynesians. Central to this chapter will be a criticism of the 
political aspect of the ELR, which flows from their Post Keynesian theory of the state. As 
will be elaborated below, the ELR faces political obstacles not adequately addressed by 
its advocates. This is due in part to the underlying liberal ideology of Post Keynesianism. 
While full employment may be worth pursuing, I contend that the arguments for the ELR 
neither provide convincing evidence that the policy can bring about full employment, nor 
that full employment is achievable under capitalism.  
I begin with Kalecki’s contribution to the discussion of full employment. Most 
ELR advocates briefly mention his work, but they seem to ignore its conclusions. I then 
question whether the ELR actually constitutes full employment, as is claimed. I argue 
                                                     
32 For a detailed discussion of the unemployment theories of Marxian and Post Keynesian economics, see 
Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
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that those employed by the ELR constitute a ‘reserve army of the employed,’ rather than 
full employment. I then consider the Marxian concept of alienation and how it relates to 
the logic underlying the ELR. What follows is a reintroduction of the New Deal and Plan 
Jefes, which I contextualize from a Marxian-historical perspective. The present-day 
conditions of the United States are far unlike those of either the New Deal or Plan Jefes – 
I argue that the ELR faces pitfalls unlike those of the previous government employment 
programs. Finally, I discuss how the Keynesian theory of the state impedes ELR 
advocates from addressing the political barriers to the implementation of their proposals. 
In order for the ELR advocates to fully appreciate the obstacles to full employment, they 
must move beyond their usual glance at Kalecki and incorporate a Marxian class analysis 
into their scholarship and political advocacy.  
 
5.1 Kalecki: The Bridge Between Marxian Political Economy and Post-Keynesianism 
 
Michał Kalecki was a Polish political economist who, concurrently and independently of 
Keynes, contributed to the theory of effective demand as well as the dynamic analysis of 
capitalist economies. However, while Keynes was inculcated by Marshallian economics, 
Kalecki’s starting point was “a clear appraisal, in the [Marxian] tradition, of the 
fundamental problems of capitalism, and the limits of Keynesianism, which could only be 
overcome by … a socialist economy” (Toporowski, 1996, p. 182). While Kalecki was 
concerned with many of the same issues as Keynes and post-Keynesians, such as 
effective demand, macro-dynamics characterized monopoly, and full employment, his 
economic theory was grounded in Marxian class analysis that engaged more thoroughly 
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with the political aspects of economic policy (Robinson, 1976). In stark contrast to 
Keynes, he considered himself to be a democratic socialist who advocated for economic 
planning in which workers had control over the production process (Toporowski, 2008).33 
However, like Keynes (and to a larger extent, the post-Keynesians), Kalecki considered 
market instability to be the chief problem of capitalism (Toporowski, 1996). Kalecki’s 
inclusion of Marxian class analysis in economic issues makes him an appropriate bridge 
between post-Keynesianism and Marxian economics. Therefore, Kalecki is a good entry 
point for a Marxian critique of the ELR.  
By the 1940s, Keynes was popularized and most economists understood that full 
employment can be theoretically achieved through government spending; debate was 
primarily over the specifics of how government spending could be used in order to 
achieve this goal. However, there was a great deal of resistance to full employment 
policies, as evidenced by the capitalist class’ opposition to the New Deal.34 Kalecki 
(1943) argues, considering the political tension between the capitalist class and the 
working class, that the primary obstacles facing full employment are not economic, but 
political:  
 
most economists are now agreed that full employment may be achieved by 
government spending …. Among the opposers of this doctrine there were (and 
still are) prominent so-called ‘economic experts’ closely connected with banking 
and industry. This suggests that there is a political background in the opposition to 
                                                     
33 Kalecki (1942) considered the economic activity of the large capitalist corporation to be a type of 
economic planning, and distinguished this from socialist planning, controlled in large part by the workers, 
which he referred to as ‘democratic planning.’ 
34 Henry (2018) provides a comprehensive overview, from the heterodox-Institutionalist perspective, of 
how ‘vested interests’ dogged the implementation of New Deal programs from the start.  
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the full employment doctrine, even though the arguments advanced are economic. 
(Kalecki, 1943, p. 324, italics added) 
 
Opposition to full employment would be confusing, if one only considered the economic 
factors; both workers and capitalists would benefit from the increased production and 
higher output of a fully employed economy. However, it begins to make sense if one 
considers the class function of unemployment.  
 Kalecki (1943) identifies three reasons why the ‘industrial leaders’ (that is, the 
capitalist class) would be opposed to full employment: “(1) dislike of government 
interference regarding employment; (2) dislike of the direction of government spending 
(public investment and subsidizing consumption); (3) dislike of the social and political 
changes resulting from the maintenance of full employment” (p. 324, italics in original). 
The capitalist class is ideologically opposed to government spending as creeping 
socialism, and is specifically opposed to spending on employment as a subversion of the 
class function of unemployment. Capitalists ostensibly fear ‘crowding out’ of private 
investment by public investment, and are morally opposed to the ‘free handouts’ of 
consumption subsidization. Kalecki, Keynes, and non-mainstream economists of the time 
argued that the fear was misguided since capitalist economy always ran at the less than 
full employment level; rather, public spending would promote private investment, 
production, and employment. By the same token, the ELR architects, such as Wray 
(1998) and Tcherneva (2018), have shown that ‘crowding out’ will not occur until full 
employment is reached because their program does not compete with the private sector, 
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and consumption subsidization increases demand for goods that raises profits, but again, 
economic arguments can conceal political motivations.  
 For Kalecki, the first two reasons for capitalist class opposition to full 
employment can be overcome by the ‘pressure of the masses,’ and full employment can 
be temporarily achieved. The main issue is the ongoing maintenance of full employment, 
which is the goal of the ELR. Broad institutional changes would need to be made to 
capitalism in order that it can accommodate sustained full employment.  
 
Indeed, under a regime of full employment, the ‘sack’ would cease to play its role 
as a disciplinary measure. The social position of the boss would be undermined, 
and the self-assurance and class-consciousness of the working class would grow. 
Strikes for wage increases and improvements in the conditions of work would 
create political tension. (Kalecki, 1943, p. 326)  
 
Kalecki is right to argue that mass movements play a crucial role in promoting full 
employment, and that an increase in class-consciousness that comes with full 
employment would threaten the hegemony of the capitalist class and the class structure of 
capitalism itself. The capitalist class is aware of this as well: “‘discipline in the factories’ 
and ‘political stability’ [that accompanies a situation of less-than-full employment] is 
more appreciated than profits by business leaders. Their class instinct tells them that 
lasting full employment is unsound from their point of view, and that unemployment is 
an integral part of the ‘normal’ capitalist system” (ibid.). This point seems completely 
ignored by the ELR advocates, or at least they stay away from the political or 
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noneconomic aspects of full employment. While they point out the noneconomic issues 
associated with unemployment of the working class (e.g. crime, depression), they do not 
pay much attention to the inverse: the noneconomic issues of full employment for the 
capitalist class.  
 Kalecki concludes by expressing doubt if the capitalist system, characterized by 
its irreconcilable class antagonisms, can adjust itself to a situation of sustained full 
employment by implementing reforms. And if capitalism cannot maintain full 
employment, “it will show itself as an outmoded system which must be scrapped” (1943, 
p. 331). The question then is whether a fundamentally different type of capitalism can 
emerge, and if so, how? This question is no less relevant today than it was in 1943, and 
the ELR architects have not shown that the ELR is capable of incubating a new form of 
capitalism characterized by full employment.  
Full Employment is regaining attention in the United States, which I argue is a 
reflection of the increasing political clout of fledgling leftist political movements, 
resembling the years approaching the New Deal. ELR advocates are gaining popularity. I 
argue that they ought to pay closer attention to Kalecki and center class antagonism and 
mass movements in their theory and policy. In the next section, I question whether the 
ELR, if implemented, could be categorized as a full employment program. 
 
5.2 Does the “Reserve Army of the Employed” Represent Full Employment?  
  
Keynes showed how full employment is theoretically possible under capitalism via state 
intervention in a way that Marx would not have anticipated. The ELR is based on this 
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contention. However, for Marxists, unemployment retains its class function as a 
necessary counterpart to capitalist accumulation. In this section, I will address this 
contrast and explain how a successful ELR would not eliminate unemployment in the 
way Keynes and Post Keynesian economists understood, nor would it subvert 
unemployment’s class function in the Marxian sense.  
 Keynes wrote very little on the specifics of implementing full employment. 
However, in his later work, he advocated for sustained full employment via planned, 
long-term public works projects (Tcherneva, 2012b).35 Despite what its advocates claim, 
the ELR is a departure from this vision. Because the ELR divorces the hiring process 
from productivity and skill, the ELR creates a population that is distinct from both public 
and private sector workers. Whereas public and private sector workers face a competitive 
job market and need to match their skills to a relevant job, ELR workers get hired on-the-
spot to do work that is by its nature temporary and low-skill. In Chapter 4, I argued that 
the sort of projects that can accommodate for these types of jobs are so limited that they 
might be considered a work requirement for an income allowance, or unemployment by 
another name. This is certainly not what Keynes had in mind.  
Indeed, ELR advocates themselves have, for the last twenty years, used Marx’s 
term ‘reserve army’ as a comparative to the ELR population, insofar as it acts as the 
economy-stabilizing buffer-stock population that controls inflation (Wray, 1998; 
Tcherneva, 2018). This may be a more apt comparison than they realize. Far from being 
an institutional reform that permanently eliminates unemployment, I argue that the ELR 
                                                     
35 See Tcherneva (2012b) for a discussion of Keynes’s advocacy for permanent full employment. She 
unwittingly exposes critical differences between Keynes’s plan for full employment and the ELR – that is, 
ELR jobs cannot be long-term, due to their buffer-stock nature. This point is argued in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis. 
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population does, in fact, function as a reserve army in the Marxian sense, which can be 
referred to more accurately as a ‘reserve army of the employed.’ 
If the ELR were enacted, the class function of unemployment would remain in 
effect; the reserve army of the employed would “[contain] within itself a mechanism for 
regulating the wage level and hence for maintaining profits” by “putting a curb on the 
[working class] pretentions” (Marx, [1867] 1990, p. 792). The ELR would not remove 
the power of ‘the sack,’ as Kalecki argued — it only quantitatively changes the material 
impact of being fired.36 Boddy and Crotty (1974) argue that the “[t]he mechanism of the 
reserve army … requires not only the existence of unemployment but also a threat to 
those still employed” (p. 11, italics in original). ELR advocates themselves (e.g. Wray, 
1998) describe the ELR population as ready and waiting to be hired by capitalists. They 
constitute a threat to the traditionally employed, and so the ELR population performs the 
class function of unemployment.  
 On the basis of foregoing examination, we can conclude that the ELR does not 
eliminate employment, either in the Marxian or Keynesian sense. Instead, it replaces the 
reserve army of the unemployed with a ‘reserve army of the employed,’ which is made 
up of workers who, occupying a position in the working class separate from those who 
are employed in the private and public sector, perform the same class function as those 
who are currently unemployed. Thus, the ELR does not present a threat to the capitalist 
accumulation process, but merely changes the makeup of the “mass of human material 
always ready for exploitation by capital in the interests of capital’s own changing 
valorization requirements” (Marx, [1867] 1990, p. 785). True full employment would 
                                                     
36 Since the New Deal, the ‘social safety net’ of the welfare state already performs this function. 
Unemployment insurance, food stamps, and other social programs protect the unemployed from abject 
poverty. The ELR would functionally act in a similar way. 
 70 
pose a threat to the dominance of capital (Kalecki, 1943). However, the ELR would not 
achieve this goal. For Wray (1998), whether labor or capital benefits from the ELR is 
merely an indicator of inflation. ELR advocates do not adequately consider the class 
function of unemployment. If they did, they would have a better chance of constructing a 
successful policy that achieves full employment, at least in the short term. In the next 
section, I critically analyze the claim made by ELR advocates that work has inherent, 
noneconomic value. 
 
5.3 Alienation and the Philosophy of Work  
 
Like all economic schools of thought, post-Keynesianism and Marxian economics have 
underlying philosophical bases, from which certain epistemological assumptions are 
made. These assumptions guide economic analysis and policy proposal. For example, 
ELR advocates seem to see work as possessing inherent noneconomic value, and this 
assumption contributes to their defense of the ELR. Tcherneva (2013) frames the ELR as 
providing the “opportunity to work,” because “genuine empowerment comes from earned 
income” (p. 97). Tymoigne (2013) notes that “labor is not just an economic activity, it is 
how human beings socialize and develop a sense of accomplishment and involvement in 
their community” (p. 81). Marxists share the view that work has inherent noneconomic 
value. However, this value can be subverted by the prevailing relationships of production 
in a given economic system. This section discusses the Marxian concept of alienation and 
its implication for ELR. It is hoped that the ELR advocates carefully consider the 
implications of work characterized by the capitalist relations of production.  
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 For Marx, what makes humanity distinct from other animals is precisely our 
ability to freely decide the nature of our labor. We consciously decide the activity that 
enables us to live and reproduce.37 Labor is not only the means for our existence; the 
ability to freely decide the nature of our labor is a full realization of our humanity, what 
Marx called ‘species-being’ ([1844] 1992, p. 328). However, if the control over labor is 
stripped from the worker, they suffer from ‘alienation,’ which manifests in three ways: 
(1) estrangement of the worker from nature; (2) estrangement of the worker from their 
capacity to perform labor; (3) estrangement of the worker from their ‘species-being’ 
(ibid.). The capitalist production process is characterized by separation of the worker 
from the ownership of the means of production. This means that the capitalist controls 
not only product of the labor process, but the time of the worker during the working-day. 
This relationship constitutes an obstacle of the worker’s ability to decide the nature of 
labor freely. For Marx, freedom in labor is “the individual’s self-realization … but 
[society] has not created the subjective and objective conditions for itself … in which 
labor becomes attractive work” (Marx, [1857] 1993, p. 611). In other words, work has the 
potential to be intrinsically good, but this potential is subverted by the capitalist 
production process.  
For work to have inherent value and to contribute to human flourishing, the 
relations of capitalist production must be replaced with those in which the worker is in 
control of their own labor. From the Marxian perspective, one cannot speak about the 
value of work in general; they must consider the relationships of production at any given 
point in history. Thus, though ELR advocates speak of the inherent value of work, their 
                                                     
37 “What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his 
mind before he constructs it in wax … man not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature; he 
also realizes his own purpose in those materials” (Marx, [1867] 1990, p. 284). 
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definition of ‘work’ is limited to capitalist employment; from their perspective, the only 
alternative to the ‘forced idleness’ of unemployment is the acceptance of a wage 
(Tcherneva, 2012a). Thus, they neglect an important qualifier for what gives work its 
value.  
 One need not accept Marx’s concepts of species-being and alienation as an 
epistemological basis in order for them to be useful tools for the analysis of work. The 
application of these concepts to issues related to unemployment helps to avoid the 
conflation of full employment with general welfare and human flourishing, as is a pitfall 
of existing Post Keynesian analysis.38 ELR advocates do not claim that the ELR would be 
a panacea, but they still take as given the idea that work is inherently good. Marxian 
analysis enables us to think critically about the nature of work as a class relation under 
capitalism and to consider the limits of reforms to capitalism such as the ELR. Even if the 
jobs provided by the ELR are paid at a living wage and ‘meaningful’ work, and even if 
the wage is disassociated from productivity (which precludes exploitation in Marxian 
terms) workers do not possess material control over the labor process. Their capacity is to 
be productive, and the means to earn a livelihood is dictated by someone other than 
themselves; any perceived dignity of work is limited in this way, even in a full 
employment situation. In the next section, we return to the New Deal and Plan Jefes, to 
discuss the circumstances of their implementation from a Marxian-historical perspective.  
 
 
                                                     
38 See Jo (2012) for a constructive critique of Post Keynesian welfare theory.  
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5.4 Why Were the New Deal and Plan Jefes Implemented?  
 
In Chapter 4, I provided an overview of the large-scale government employment 
programs of the New Deal and Plan Jefes, which ELR advocates claim to provide 
evidence of the workability of the ELR in the United States today (Tcherneva, 2018; 
Forstater, 2004). I previously argued that the design of these programs is dissimilar to 
ELR in a way that casts doubt upon the notion that their success is an indication of the 
potential for the success of the ELR today. In addition to these concerns, the ELR 
advocates also fail to adequately consider the important historical factors that led to the 
implementation of the New Deal and Plan Jefes. In this section I describe the specific 
conditions of the economic and political landscape in which these programs were 
implemented from a Marxian perspective, and how these conditions relate to those of 
present-day United States. These differences present obstacles to the implementation of 
the ELR.  
 Recall from the previous chapter that the unemployment rate rose in the United 
States from 3.2 percent in 1929 to 25.2 percent in 1933 (Bureau of the Census, 1975, p. 
232). This led to widespread social unrest. Many workers and unemployed people 
became radicalized and looked to alternatives to the capitalist system. Protests during this 
time were massive and militant. On March 6, 1930, more than one million people 
demonstrated against unemployment under the leadership of the Communist Party 
(Klehr, 1984). Funerals for labor leaders killed by police were attended by tens of 
thousands of people in Chicago and New York City, with coffins placed under banners of 
V. I. Lenin. Unions increasingly gained respect for, and were led by, revolutionaries. 
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Thousands of leading intellectuals and artists publicly declared their allegiance to 
communism. Farmers’ associations, often influenced by communists and radicals, had 
membership in the tens of thousands, and were sympathetic to union struggles (ibid.). 
This historical situation can be viewed as a manifestation of one of capitalism’s internal 
contradictions in the Marxian sense. While unemployment serves a necessary class 
function for capitalist accumulation, it can also act as a catalyst for militant opposition to 
capitalist class dominance.  
Goldfield (1989) writes that “the virtually unanimous opinion among New Deal 
Democrats and progressive Republicans (the overwhelming majority [of the United 
States congress]) was that government regulation was necessary to constrain, limit, and 
control the increasingly militant labor movement” (p. 1274). This shows that the New 
Deal and its large-scale employment programs were explicitly intended to mollify the 
revolutionary zeal in the United States. They were designed to be a temporary defense for 
the capitalist accumulation process against the threat posed by the mass movements that 
were growing amidst the Great Depression, in order to bring the social order back from 
the brink of collapse.  
 The political circumstances in Argentina that led to the enactment of Plan Jefes 
were similar to those preceding the New Deal. As noted in the previous chapter, 
unemployment in Argentina was at 25 percent in 2002. Years of political and economic 
instability led to massive demonstrations, which were met by violence from the police. 
Confidence in the government was effectively non-existent, and social unrest was 
widespread. Plan Jefes was specifically enacted in order to counter this unrest and restore 
legitimacy to the government in the face of massive political uprising (Kostzer, 2008). 
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The program did successfully contribute to the decrease in unemployment when it was 
enacted in 2002, and was discontinued in 2006 when the economy began recovering.  
 It is obvious that the conditions of present-day United States are vastly different 
than those of Plan Jefes and the New Deal. In spite of the many social and economic 
issues facing the U.S., there is no large-scale revolutionary movement that presents a 
threat to the social order or to capital accumulation. At time of writing (November 2018), 
unemployment in the United States is officially at 3.7 percent, which is the lowest since 
December 1969 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018a).39  
ELR advocates look to the New Deal and Plan Jefes as a model for the ELR 
program, but they seem to misunderstand the significance of the political conditions that 
gave rise to these programs. This is notable because they are certainly aware that mass 
movements and civil unrest were necessary prerequisites for their implementation. For 
example, Murray and Forstater (2013), in their empirical research regarding ELR-style 
programs, even acknowledge directly that such programs are politically feasible “during 
times of economic crisis and structural change” (p. 2). Thus, they seem to believe two 
contradictory things: (1) the existing employment programs are evidence that the ELR 
can be successful, but (2) the ELR does not require similar economic and political 
conditions for its implementation (even though they explicitly state that these programs 
are responses to economic and political crises!). While Murray and Forstater (ibid.) do 
mention the need for ‘grassroots support’ for these programs, the lack of attention paid to 
the political (especially class-related) conditions seems to betray a similar political 
naiveté of Keynes himself — the idea that merely spreading the right ideas among the 
                                                     
39 There are, of course, many situational factors outside of those discussed here that distinguish the present 
day from the early 1930s that cannot be accounted for in economic data.   
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political and economic elite can lead to the implementation of full employment. This will 
be discussed further in the next section.  
 
5.5 “Leave It to Me,” Revisited – The Political Project of the ELR  
 
In Chapter 3, I discussed how there currently exists no coherent Post Keynesian theory of 
the state. This is specifically problematic for ELR advocates because the state is 
ultimately responsible for the implementation and maintenance of their policy agenda. In 
this section I will discuss how the theoretical weakness of the Post Keynesian theory of 
the state, utilized implicitly by the ELR advocates, inhibits both the workability of the 
ELR and the political project necessary for its implementation. I will again suggest that 
the incorporation of Marxian analysis would strengthen their advocacy of the ELR. This 
section begins with Keynes’s political economy and its influence on the ELR. 
 Keynes was a politically liberal economist; he fervently hoped and believed that 
state is class-neutral and it can and will solve many of capitalism’s macroeconomic 
problems (Sherman, 1987). His primary political aim was to convince economic and 
political elites that his ideas were correct; if only those in power accepted the truth of his 
ideas, the worst parts of capitalism could be ameliorated: “the right analysis of the 
problem … can cure the disease of unemployment” (Keynes, 1936, p. 381). It was up to 
enlightened intellectuals like himself to save capitalism from self-destruction; “The 
economic problem is not too difficult to solve. Leave it to me,” he says, “I will look after 
it” (Keynes, 1982, p. 34).  
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The ELR advocates have a similar political project to Keynes. This is especially 
clear in their advocacy for Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). As mentioned above, they 
admit that the ELR is not a panacea. However, they appear to see the mainstream 
acceptance of MMT as tantamount to such a cure-all. One need not look farther than the 
title of Wray’s seminal 1998 work on the subject: Understanding Modern Money: The 
Key to Full Employment. He seems to argue that if only we understood the secret of how 
money actually operates, we unlock the potential for a fully employed economy. Lavoie 
(2013) points out that advocacy of MMT is so steeped in its ideological “truthfulness” 
that even sympathetic critiques of MMT are met with over-reaction and hostility. ‘Leave 
it to us,’ the MMT/ELR economists say, and the state will provide for the general welfare 
without concern for inflation or debt crisis. Their engagement with the general public via 
blogging and use of social media (Juniper, Sharpe, & Watts, 2014) shows that they are 
less skeptical of the masses than Keynes was, and are more interested in popular, 
democratic support for their ideas. However, their activism is, like Keynes, centered on 
convincing people of the merits of their ideas, as though a mere acceptance of ideas leads 
to political change. 
 Marxian economists, on the other hand, reject the idealism inherent in the Post 
Keynesian activism, which rooted in their liberal understanding of the state. Marxists 
center the role of mass movements and political pressure from the working class as the 
catalyst of institutional changes to capitalism such as full employment. Recall that, for 
the majority of Marxists, the state is a set of institutions that acts to guarantee the 
continuation of capital accumulation and the ownership relations inherent in that process. 
If mass movements of the working class become so potent as to threaten the class 
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structure itself, the state must implement new reforms in order to protect the class 
makeup of capitalist society. Under these conditions, a policy resembling the ELR 
becomes politically feasible, if only temporarily. The activism of the ELR advocates, in 
bringing an understanding of MMT and full employment to lay people via social media 
and other popular means, is a positive step in the direction of the implementation of 
something similar to the ELR. However, their potential for success is limited by the 
absence of a coherent theory of the state, and an inadequate level of engagement with the 
power and class dynamics of modern capitalism in their scholarship and advocacy. 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
Economists have argued since the 1930s that full employment is theoretically possible in 
a capitalist economy via state intervention. In spite of this, full employment in peacetime 
has never been achieved in a capitalist economy. Capitalists have used the language of 
economics to advance their political opposition to full employment. Full employment can 
be temporarily achieved in peacetime with pressure from mass working-class 
movements, but the maintenance of full employment requires a fundamental shift in the 
institutional makeup of the capitalist economy. It is yet unclear whether capitalism is 
capable of accommodating a new institution such as permanent full employment, but 





In this thesis, I have argued along Marxian lines that permanent full employment is 
impossible under capitalism, because the class function of unemployment is necessary for 
the continuation of capital accumulation and its underlying relationships of production. I 
have also shown that the ELR is incapable of providing meaningful employment that 
meets social needs because of its buffer-stock nature. However, that is not to say that full 
employment should not be pursued. There are many unmet social needs, as well as social 
ills that plague economies characterized by unemployment (Tcherneva, 2017). 
Policymakers should identify these social needs and design massive public works 
programs based on those needs, in order to meaningfully employ as many people as 
possible.  
 It must be remembered, when crafting such a program, that full employment is 
anathema to the capitalist class, and that the state is largely beholden to capital. History 
has shown that government employment programs have only been enacted when mass 
movements have forced the hand of the capitalist class, in order to preserve the capital 
accumulation process. Any sort of job guarantee program, once enacted, will face 
sustained opposition. Mass movements must be ready to defend it.   
Full employment would represent a transfer of power in the class struggle from 
the capitalist class to the working class. The increase in material wealth and social 
cohesion of the working class that comes with full employment could increase class 
consciousness and threaten the hegemony of the capitalist class and class structure of 
capitalism itself. As Foster (2013) argues, “full employment, rather than being viewed as 
 80 
an end in itself, should be utilized as the strategic basis from which labor could launch an 
all-out attack on the bourgeois rules of the game. Indeed, it was this possibility that made 
a full-employment state so dangerous to the capitalist class” (p. 8). Should capitalism 
continue to fail to provide permanent full employment, the short-term full employment 
achieved by the cooperation of mass movements and careful policy design could act as a 
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